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Discretionary Monetary Policy and Inflation Persistence

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Abstract

Rational expectations models of staggered price/wage contracts have failed to replicate the observed persistence in inflation and unemployment during disinflation periods. The current literature on this persistency puzzle has focused on augmenting the nominal contract model with imperfect credibility and learning. In this paper, I re-examine the persistency puzzle by focusing on the discretionary nature of monetary policy. I show that when the central bank is allowed to re-optimize a quadratic loss function each period, imperfect credibility and learning, even in the absence of staggered contracts, can generate a significant amount of inflation persistence and employment losses during a disinflationary period.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Hunter College: Department of Economics in its series Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers with number 424.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:htr:hcecon:424

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Keywords: Monetary policy; Disinflation; Credibility; Inflation persistence;

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References

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  1. Christopher J. Erceg and Andrew T. Levin, 2001. "Imperfect Credibility and Inflation Persistence," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 19, Society for Computational Economics.
  2. John B. Taylor, 1998. "Staggered Price and Wage Setting in Macroeconomics," NBER Working Papers 6754, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. David Andolfatto & Paul Gomme, 2001. "Monetary policy regimes and beliefs," Working Paper 9905, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  4. Laurence Ball, 1993. "What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?," NBER Working Papers 4306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  7. Peter N. Ireland, 1995. "Optimal disinflationary paths," Working Paper 95-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  8. Chan G. Huh & Kevin J. Lansing, 1997. "Expectations, credibility, and disinflation in a small macroeconomic model," Working Paper 9713, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  9. Peter N. Ireland, 1998. "Does the Time-Consistency Problem Explain the Behavior of Inflation in the United States?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 415, Boston College Department of Economics.
  10. Laurence Ball, 1992. "Disinflation With Imperfect Credibility," NBER Working Papers 3983, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Jeff Fuhrer & George Moore, 1993. "Inflation persistence," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 93-17, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  12. John B. Taylor, 1984. "Union Wage Settlements During a Disinflation," NBER Working Papers 0985, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
  14. Edmund Phelps, 1978. "Disinflation without recession: Adaptive guideposts and monetary policy," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 114(4), pages 783-809, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Marco Bonomo & Carlos Carvalho, 2008. "Imperfectly credible disinflation under endogenous time-dependent pricing," Staff Reports 355, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  2. Meixing DAI & Moïse SIDIROPOULOS & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2009. "Monetary policy transparency and inflation persistence in a small open economy," Working Papers of BETA 2009-08, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  3. Marco Bonomo & Carlos Viana de Carvalho, 2004. "Endogenous Time-Dependent Rules and the Costs of Disinflation with Imperfect Credibility," Macroeconomics 0402006, EconWPA, revised 04 Sep 2005.
  4. Naveen Srinivasan & Pankaj Kumar, 2012. "Inflation Persistence: Does Credibility of the Monetary Regime Matter?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 2944-2954.
  5. Muhammad, Omer & de Haan, Jakob & Scholtens, Bert, 2014. "An Empirical Analysis of Excess Interbank Liquidity: A Case Study of Pakistan," MPRA Paper 56143, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Karanassou, Marika & Snower, Dennis J., 2007. "Inflation Persistence and the Phillips Curve Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 2600, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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