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Learning Rational Expectations In A Policy Game

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Author Info
Cripps, Martin

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Abstract

Rational expectations is a maintained assumption in the analysis of economic policy. Here we examine how two types of learning rational expectations (rational and econometric) affect the time profile of optimal policy. In both cases the government adopts policies which delay convergence to rational expectations. There is also a reduction in the inflationary bias, in one case permanently in the other temporarily.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 297.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1988
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Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:297

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  1. Caleiro, António, 2008. "How Can Voters Classify an Incumbent under Output Persistence," Economics Discussion Papers 2008-16, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
  2. Chan G. Huh & Kevin J. Lansing, 1998. "Expectations, credibility, and disinflation in a small macroeconomic model," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory and Econometrics 98-01, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
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