Learning Rational Expectations In A Policy Game
AbstractRational expectations is a maintained assumption in the analysis of economic policy. Here we examine how two types of learning rational expectations (rational and econometric) affect the time profile of optimal policy. In both cases the government adopts policies which delay convergence to rational expectations. There is also a reduction in the inflationary bias, in one case permanently in the other temporarily.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 297.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
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