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Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets

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  • Svensson, Lars E. O.

Abstract

The paper discusses the implementation of inflation-targeting across countries. It argues that the intermediate variable under an inflation target is, in effect, the inflation forecast. Such a regime is shown to confer benefits over other regimes, such as money and exchange rate targeting: in terms of the efficient implementation of policy; in terms of transparency; and in terms of the stabilisation of inflation and output.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 41 (1997)
Issue (Month): 6 (June)
Pages: 1111-1146

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:41:y:1997:i:6:p:1111-1146

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