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Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts

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Author Info
Svensson, L.E.O.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm - International Economic Studies in its series Papers with number 595.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:stocin:595

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Related research
Keywords: MONETARY POLICY; CENTRAL BANKS; INFLATION;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jürgen & Waller, Christopher, 1993. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 752, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Gottfries, Nils & Horn, Henrik, 1987. "Wage Formation and the Persistence of Unemployment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(388), pages 877-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "The Swedish Experience of an Inflation Target," CEPR Discussion Papers 1103, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Goodhart, Charles A E, 1994. "What Should Central Banks Do? What Should Be Their Macroeconomic Objectives and Operations?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1424-36, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L & Pearlman, Joseph, 1995. "Can Delegation be Counterproductive? The Choice of 'Conservative' Bankers in Open Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers 1148, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. José Viñals & Charles Goodhart, 1994. "Strategy and Tactics of Monetary Policy: Examples from Europe and the Antipodes," FMG Special Papers sp61, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Olivier J. Blanchard & Lawrence H. Summers, 1986. "Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem," Working papers 427, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  10. Lockwood, Ben & Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 1998. "Designing Monetary Policy When Unemployment Persists," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(259), pages 327-45, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-70, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Svensson, L.E.O., 1993. "The Simplest Test of Inflation Target Credibility," Papers 560, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
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  13. Charles A. E. Goodhart & Jose Vinals, 1994. "Strategy an tactics of monetary policy: examples from Europe and the Antipodes," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 139-194. [Downloadable!]
  14. Lockwood, Ben & Philippopoulos, Apostolis, 1994. "Insider Power, Unemployment Dynamics and Multiple Inflation Equilibria," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(241), pages 59-77, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1991. "Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," CEPR Discussion Papers 518, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Charles Goodhart & José Viñals, 1994. "Strategy and Tactics of Monetary Policy: Examples from Europe and the Antipodes," Banco de España Working Papers 9425, Banco de España.
  18. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
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  19. Carl E. Walsh, 1994. "Is New Zealand's Reserve Bank Act of 1989 an optimal central bank contract?," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 94-01, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
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  20. Robert P. Flood & Peter Isard, 1988. "Monetary Policy Strategies," NBER Working Papers 2770, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Charles Goodhart & José Viñals, 1994. "Strategy and Tactics of Monetary Policy: Examples from Europe and the Antipodes," Banco de España Working Papers 9425, Banco de España.
  24. Jonsson, G., 1995. "Monetary Politics and Unemployment Persistence," Papers 593, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  25. Fischer, Stanley, 1995. "Central-Bank Independence Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 201-06, May.
  26. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Canzoneri, Matthew B & Nolan, Charles & Yates, Tony, 1996. "Mechanisms for Achieving Monetary Stability: Inflation Targeting Versus the ERM," CEPR Discussion Papers 1418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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