1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "Strategic discipline in monetary policy with private information: optimal targeting periods," Working Papers 1990-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "Strategic Discipline in Monetary Policy With Private Information: Optimal Targeting Periods," UCLA Economics Working Papers 584, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Stein, Jeremy C, 1989. "Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 32-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-70, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1983. "Monetary policy games and the role of private information," International Finance Discussion Papers 249, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
6. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1986. "Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-92, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Marvin Goodfriend, 1985. "Monetary mystique : secrecy and central banking," Working Paper 85-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
7. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Robert P. Flood & Peter Isard, 1988. "Monetary Policy Strategies," NBER Working Papers 2770, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 13932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank communication and monetary policy - a survey of theory and evidence," Working Paper Series 898, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
   • Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 1038, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies.. [Downloadable!]
   • Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," DNB Working Papers 170, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
   • Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-45, December.
2. Andrew G Haldane & Vicky Read, . "Monetary policy surprises and the yield curve," Bank of England working papers 106, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
3. repec:bep:mactop:v:5:y:2005:i:1:p:1277-1277 is not listed on IDEAS
   Other versions:
   • Geraats, P.M., 2004. "Transparency and Reputation: The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0473, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
4. Michael Lamla & Sarah M. Rupprecht, 2006. "The Impact of ECB Communication on Financial Market Expectations," KOF Working papers 06-135, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
5. Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1999. "The equilibrium degree of transparency and control in monetary policy," International Finance Discussion Papers 651, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1999. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 7152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 1999. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2195, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1999. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," Papers 669, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   • Svensson, Lars & Faust, Jon, 1999. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," Seminar Papers 669, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
   • Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2002. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(2), pages 520-39, May.
6. Marco Hoeberichts, 2002. "The Credibility of Central Bank Announcements," Banco de España Working Papers 0221, Banco de España. [Downloadable!]
7. Kenneth N. Kuttner & Adam S. Posen, 1999. "Does talk matter after all? Inflation targeting and central bank behavior," Staff Reports 88, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
8. Bernhard Winkler, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 26, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
9. Wasim Shahid Malik & Musleh-ud Din, 2008. "Monetary Policy Transparency in Pakistan: An Independent Analysis," PIDE-Working Papers 2008:44, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. [Downloadable!]
10. Paul Hubert, 2009. "An Empirical Review of Federal Reserve’s Informational Advantage," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2009-03, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE). [Downloadable!]
11. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M. & Schaling, E., 1997. "Why money talks and wealth whispers : monetary uncertainty and mystique," Discussion Paper 47, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco & Schaling, Eric, 2000. "Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(2), pages 218-35, May.
12. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2003. "Signalling and Commitment: Monetary versus Inflation Targeting," CEPR Discussion Papers 4151, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2006. "Signaling And Commitment: Monetary Versus Inflation Targeting," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(05), pages 595-624, November. [Downloadable!]
13. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & van der Cruijsen, Carin A B, 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 6070, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Cruijsen, C. van der & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency: A Survey," Discussion Paper 2007-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    • Carin van der Cruijsen & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2007. "The economic impact of central bank transparency: a survey," DNB Working Papers 132, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
14. Herschel I. Grossman, 1992. "Monetary Economics: A Review Essay," NBER Working Papers 3686, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Grossman, Herschel I., 1991. "Monetary economics : A review essay," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 323-345, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi & Daniel Gros, 2001. "Is the ECB Sufficiently Accountable and Transparent?," Economics Working Papers 007, European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes. [Downloadable!]
16. Seth B. Carpenter, 2004. "Transparency and monetary policy: what does the academic literature tell policymakers?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-35, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
17. Petra Geraats, 2000. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series 1009, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Petra M. Geraats, 2001. "Why adopt transparency? The publication of central bank forecasts," Working Paper Series 41, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    • Petra M. Geraats, 2001. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Macroeconomics 0012011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    • Geraats, Petra M, 2000. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," CEPR Discussion Papers 2582, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Geraats, P.M., 2001. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Papers 41, Quebec a Montreal - Recherche en gestion.