Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The democratic accountability of the European Central Bank

Contents:

Author Info

  • L. BINI-SMAGHI

    (European Central Bank)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The European Central Bank (ECB) is considered to be an institution with a high level of accountability compared with other central banks. However, the matter has yet to be investigated in practice. Accountability of the ECB will have to be checked by governing bodies both within and outside the ECB as well as the public. A survey is undertaken of the main reasons for central bank accountability, especially for the ECB.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10593/10477
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro in its journal BNL Quarterly Review.

    Volume (Year): 51 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 205 ()
    Pages: 119-143

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:1998:22

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.economiacivile.it

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www.economiacivile.it

    Related research

    Keywords: Evaluation; Central banks; European Union. European Central Bank;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-97, May.
    2. Jakob de Haan, 1997. "The European Central Bank: Independence, accountability and strategy: A review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 395-426, December.
    3. Marvin Goodfriend, 1985. "Monetary mystique : secrecy and central banking," Working Paper 85-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    4. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    5. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    6. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    7. Fischer, Stanley, 1995. "Central-Bank Independence Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 201-06, May.
    8. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Oh, Seonghwan, 1995. "When and how much to talk credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 341-357, April.
    9. Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
    13. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-70, December.
    14. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
    15. Stein, Jeremy C, 1989. "Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 32-42, March.
    16. Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn King, 1996. "Independence and Accountability," Bank of England working papers 49, Bank of England.
    17. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1998. "Independently Blue? Accountability and Independence in the New European Central Bank," CEPR Discussion Papers 1842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Aerdt C.F.J. Houben, 2001. "What central banks have learned: lessons from pre-EMU Europe," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 54(218), pages 289-311.
    2. Manfred Neumann, 2002. "Transparency in monetary policy," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(4), pages 353-365, December.
    3. Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "The Breakup of the Euro Area," NBER Working Papers 13393, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco, 2002. "Central Bank Accountability and Transparency: Theory and Some Evidence," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 73-96, Spring.
    5. Aerdt C.F.J. Houben, 2001. "What central banks have learned: lessons from pre-EMU Europe," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 54(218), pages 289-311.
    6. Michael Taylor & Marc Quintyn & Eva H. G. Hüpkes, 2005. "The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors," IMF Working Papers 05/51, International Monetary Fund.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:1998:22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Carlo D'Ippoliti).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.