It is often argued that a high level of central-band independence coupled with an explicit mandate that the bank aim for price stability are important institutional devices for maintaining that stability. Indeed, a number of countries have recently increased the independence of their central banks in order to raise their commitment to price stability.
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Length: 82 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:prinfi:19
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
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