The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence
AbstractIt is often argued that a high level of central-band independence coupled with an explicit mandate that the bank aim for price stability are important institutional devices for maintaining that stability. Indeed, a number of countries have recently increased the independence of their central banks in order to raise their commitment to price stability.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University, in its series Princeton Studies in International Economics with number 19.
Length: 82 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: International Finance Section, Department of Economics Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A
Phone: (609) 258-4000
Fax: (609) 258-6419
Web page: http://www.econ.princeton.edu/
More information through EDIRC
CENTRAL BANKS; MONETARY POLICY;
Other versions of this item:
- Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.