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The Breakup of the Euro Area

In: Europe and the Euro

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  • Barry Eichengreen

Abstract

The possibility that the euro area might break up was being raised even before the single currency existed. These scenarios were then lent new life five or six years on, when appreciation of the euro and problems of slow growth in various member states led politicians to blame the European Central Bank for disappointing economic performance. Highly-placed European officials reportedly discussed the possibility that one or more participants might withdraw from the monetary union. How seriously should we take these scenarios? And how significant would be the economic and political consequences? It is unlikely, I argue here, that one or more members of the euro area will leave in the next ten years; total disintegration of the euro area is even more unlikely. While other authors have minimized the technical difficulties of reintroducing a national currency, I suggest that those technical difficulties would be quite formidable. Nor is it certain that the economic problems of the participating member states would be significantly ameliorated by abandoning the euro. And even if there are immediate economic benefits, there would be longer-term political costs.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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This chapter was published in:

  • Alberto Alesina & Francesco Giavazzi, 2010. "Europe and the Euro," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number ales08-1, October.
    This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 11654.

    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:11654

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    Cited by:
    1. Dirk Meyer, 2012. "Ein Fahrplan zum Euroaustritt – technische Vorbereitung und Durchführung im Austrittsland," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 65(06), pages 22-27, 03.
    2. Eric Dor, 2011. "Leaving the euro zone: a user’s guide," Working Papers 2011-ECO-06, IESEG School of Management.
    3. Malliaris, A.G. & Malliaris, Mary, 2011. "Are oil, gold and the euro inter-related? time series and neural network analysis," MPRA Paper 35266, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Elias Papaioannou & Richard Portes, 2008. "The international role of the euro: a status report," European Economy - Economic Papers 317, Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.

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