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Central-Bank Independence Revisited

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Author Info
Fischer, Stanley
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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 85 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 201-06
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:85:y:1995:i:2:p:201-06

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  1. Christopher W. Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, 2008. "Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness," IMF Working Papers 08/119, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Viegi, Nicola, 2001. "Credibility, Transparency and Asymmetric Information in Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2671, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. M. Demertzis & A. Hughes Hallett & N. Viegi, 2002. "An Independent Central Bank faced with Elected Government: A Political Economy Conflict," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 686, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  4. JoAnne Morris & Tonny Lybek, 2004. "Central Bank Governance: A Survey of Boards and Management," IMF Working Papers 04/226, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  5. Andrés Elberg & Vittorio Corbo & José Tessada, 1999. "Monetary Policy in Latin America: Underpinnings and Procedures," Cuadernos de Economía (Latin American Journal of Economics), Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 36(109), pages 897-927. [Downloadable!]
  6. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Iannis A. Mourmouras & Michael G. Arghyrou, 1999. "Monetary Policy at the European Periphery. Greek Experience and Lessons for Transition Economies," CERT Discussion Papers 9910, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Richard Mash, 2000. "The Time Inconsistency of Monetary Policy with Inflation Persistence," Economics Series Working Papers 015, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Andreas Freytag, 2004. "EMU Enlargement: Which Concept of Convergence to Apply?," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 11/2004, Friedrich-Schiller-Universit�t Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakult�t. [Downloadable!]
  10. Marco Catenaro, 2000. "Macroeconomic Policy Interactions in the EMU: A Case for Fiscal Policy Co-ordination," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 0003, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
  11. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1999. "An Independent Central Bank Faced With Elected Governments," CEPR Discussion Papers 2219, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Lars E.O. Svensson, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," NBER Working Papers 5251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Marc Quintyn & Michael Taylor, 2002. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 02/46, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  14. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana, 2002. "Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Policy Games and the Optimal Design of Central Banks," Working Papers 0220, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  16. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Government Leadership and Central Bank Design," Working Papers 0208, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Dec 2004. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Marcel Peter & Geoffrey Heenan & Scott Roger, 2006. "Implementing Inflation Targeting: Institutional Arrangements, Target Design, and Communications," IMF Working Papers 06/278, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  18. Bruno, Michael & Easterly, William, 1995. "Inflation crises and long-run growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1517, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi & Daniel Gros, 2001. "Is the ECB Sufficiently Accountable and Transparent?," Economics Working Papers 007, European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes. [Downloadable!]
  20. Eric Le Borgne & Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2003. "A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence," IMF Working Papers 03/144, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  21. Gauti Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, 2005. "The politics of central bank independence: a theory of pandering and learning in government," Staff Reports 205, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
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