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Strategic Discipline in Monetary Policy With Private Information: Optimal Targeting Periods Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Michelle R. Garfinkel (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)
Seonghwan Oh (UCLA)
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number
584.
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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1990Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:584Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy ,"
Journal of Monetary Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985.
"The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stein, Jeremy C, 1989.
"Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 32-42, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985.
"Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-70, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986.
"A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hillier, Brian & Malcomson, James M, 1984.
"Dynamic Inconsistency, Rational Expectations, and Optimal Government Policy ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1437-51, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988.
"Credibility and politics ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Robert P. Flood & Peter Isard, 1988.
"Monetary Policy Strategies ,"
NBER Working Papers
2770, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977.
"Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982.
"Strategic Information Transmission ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rogoff, Kenneth, 1987.
"Reputational constraints on monetary policy ,"
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy ,
Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 141-181, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kenneth Rogoff, 1987.
"Reputational Constraints on Monetary Policy ,"
NBER Working Papers
1986, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990.
"When and how much to talk: credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information ,"
Working Papers
1990-004, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990.
"When and How Much to Talk: Credibility and Flexibility in Monetary Policy With Private Information ,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
593, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Oh, Seonghwan, 1995.
"When and how much to talk credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information ,"
Journal of Monetary Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 341-357, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2000.
"Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets ,"
Working papers
2000-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2002.
"Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker? ,"
Working papers
2002-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Chortareas, Georgios E & Miller, Stephen M, 2003.
" Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker? ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 271-95, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2000.
"Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency ,"
Working papers
2000-03, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2002.
[Downloadable!]
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