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Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information

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Author Info
Cukierman, Alex
Liviatan, Nissan

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 27 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 99-127
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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:27:y:1991:i:1:p:99-127

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  1. Chris Canavan & Mariano Tommasi, 1997. "Visibility and Credibility in the Political Economy of Reform," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 346., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Rafael Santos & Aloisio Araujo, 2007. "Inflation Targeting, Credibility and Confidence Crises," Working Papers Series 140, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Carlos Esteban Posada & cposadpo@banrep.gov.co, . "La Credibilidad de la Política Anti-Inflacionaria," Borradores de Economia 066, Banco de la Republica de Colombia. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Cukierman, A., 1999. "Establishing a reputation for dependability by means of inflation targets," Discussion Paper 99, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Kiguel, Miguel A. & Liviatan, Nissan, 1989. "The old and the new in heterodox stabilization programs : lessons from the 1960s and the 1980s," Policy Research Working Paper Series 323, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Florin Bilbiie & David Stasavage, 2005. "Incomplete Fiscal Rules with Imperfect Enforcement," Economics Papers 2005-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
  7. Alex Cukierman, 2006. "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions: Past, Present, and Future," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 360, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2002. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Working papers 2002-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Cukierman, Alex & Goldstein, Itay & Spiegel, Yossi, 2003. "The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime and Speculative Attacks," CEPR Discussion Papers 3714, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Mariano Tommasi, 1995. "Why Does it Take a Nixon to go to China?," UCLA Economics Working Papers 728, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. José I. Garcia de Paso, 1996. "A partisan model of political monetary cycles," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(2), pages 243-262, May. [Downloadable!]
  12. Kiguel, Miguel & Liviatan, Nissan, 1990. "The business cycle associated with exchange-rate-based stabilization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 513, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  13. Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, 2005. "Pegged Exchange Rate Regimes -- A Trap?," NBER Working Papers 11652, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Cukierman, A., 1996. "Targeting monetary aggregates and inflation in Europe," Discussion Paper 32, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. B. Adolph, . "Monetary Policy under Imperfectly Observable Commitment: The Return of the Time Inconsistency Problem," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1995-34, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
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