Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie.

Volume (Year): 73 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 125-147
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:73:y:2001:i:2:p:125-147

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research

Keywords: monetary control uncertainty; inflation bias; central-bank independence; E51; E52; E58;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Eijffinger, S. & Schaling, E., 1995. "The Ultimate Determinants of Central Bank Independence," Discussion Paper 5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
3. Friedman, Milton, 1971. "Government Revenue from Inflation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(4), pages 846-56, July-Aug.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-70, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1983. "Monetary policy games and the role of private information," International Finance Discussion Papers 249, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
7. Marty, Alvin L., 1976. "A note on the welfare cost of money creation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 121-124, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco, 1998. "The Trade off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 397-411, July.
   Other versions:
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M., 1996. "The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness," Discussion Paper 44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
9. Mankiw, N. Gregory, 1987. "The optimal collection of seigniorage : Theory and evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 327-341, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • N. Gregory Mankiw, 1988. "The Optimal Collection of Seigniorage: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 2270, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Swank, Otto H, 1994. " Better Monetary Control May Increase the Inflationary Bias of Policy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 96(1), pages 125-31.
11. Auernheimer, Leonardo, 1974. "The Honest Government's Guide to the Revenue from the Creation of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(3), pages 598-606, May/June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    Other versions:
    • Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes books.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.