1. Eijffinger, S. & Schaling, E., 1995. "The Ultimate Determinants of Central Bank Independence," Discussion Paper 5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
2. Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals," International Finance Discussion Papers 605, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Papers 636, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   • Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," CEPR Discussion Papers 1852, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Jon Faust & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," NBER Working Papers 6452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Svensson, Lars E.O. & Faust, John, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Seminar Papers 636, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
   • Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-97, May.
4. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1973. "Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 326-34, June.
5. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Dave Turner & Elena Seghezza, 1999. "Testing for a Common OECD Phillips Curve," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 219, OECD, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
7. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco, 1998. "The Trade off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 397-411, July.
   Other versions:
   • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M., 1996. "The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness," Discussion Paper 44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
9. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, January.
10. Dixit, Avinash, 2000. "A Repeated Game Model of Monetary Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 759-80, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 619-30, October.
12. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    Other versions:
    • Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 195-225. [Downloadable!]
13. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Fischer, Stanley, 1995. "Central-Bank Independence Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 201-06, May.
15. Dixit, Avinash, 2001. "Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 589-613, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2004. "Post-Thatcher Fiscal Strategies in the U.K.: An Interpretation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
2. Ali al-Nowaihi & Paul Levine & Alex Mandilaras, 2006. "Central Bank Independence and the `Free Lunch Puzzle': A New Perspective," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 0806, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
3. Andrew Hallett & Nicola Viegi, 2002. "Inflation Targeting as a Coordination Device," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 341-362, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller & Langnan Chen, 2009. "The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models," Working Papers 0909, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller & Langnan Chen, 2006. "The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models," Working papers 2006-05, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
5. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2008. "Sustainable fiscal policies and budgetary risk under alternative monetary policy arrangements," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 1-28, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Stephen M. Miller & Huiping Yuan, 2009. "Consistent Targets and Optimal Monetary Policy: Conservative Central Banker Redux," Working Papers 0908, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Stephen M. Miller & Huiping Yuan, 2005. "Consistent Targets and Optimal Monetary Policy: Conservative Central Banker Redux," Working papers 2005-55, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
7. Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller, 2009. "Implementing Optimal Monetary Policy: Objectives and Rules," Working Papers 0911, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
8. Jan Libich & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Petr Stehlik, 2007. "Monetary And Fiscal Policy Interaction With Various Degrees And Types Of Commitment," CAMA Working Papers 2007-21, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Libich, Jan & Stehlík, Petr, 2007. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction with Various Degrees and Types of Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers 6586, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Government Leadership and Central Bank Design," Working Papers 0208, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Dec 2004. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana, 2002. "Government Leadership and Central Bank Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3395, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2005. "In Praise of Fiscal Restraint and Debt Rules. What the Euro Zone Might Do Now," CEPR Discussion Papers 5043, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Jan Libich, 2007. "Fiscal-monetary Interactions: The Effect of Fiscal Restraint and Public Monitoring on Central Bank Credibility," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 559-576, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)