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Independent Monetary Policies and Social Equality

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Author Info
Andrew Hughes Hallett () (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)
Diana N. Weymark () (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

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Abstract

The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy has a social equality component, there is a natural conflict between optimally configured monetary policies and equality. As a result, governments interested in social redistribution, when faced with an independent central bank, will have an incentive to limit their use of fiscal policy.

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File URL: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/wparchive/workpaper/vu03-w07.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2003
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University in its series Working Papers with number 0307.

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Date of creation: Apr 2003
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Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0307

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Web page: http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/econ/
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Related research
Keywords: Monetary independence; central bank conservatism; income redistribution;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2001. "The Cost of Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union," Working Papers 0128, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1973. "Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 326-34, June.
  4. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. John B. Taylor, 2000. "Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 21-36, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    Other versions:
  7. Diana N. Weymark, 2000. "Inflation, Income Redistribution, and Optimal Central Bank Independence," Working Papers 0102, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Mar 2002. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. N. Acocella & G. Bartolomeo & Andrew Hallett, 2006. "Controllability in Policy Games: Policy Neutrality and the Theory of Economic Policy Revisited," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 91-112, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Diana N. Weymark, 2005. "Inflation, Government Transfers, and Optimal Central Bank Independence," Working Papers 0502, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2004. "Post-Thatcher Fiscal Strategies in the U.K.: An Interpretation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Bernoth, Kerstin & Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Lewis, John, 2008. "Did Fiscal Policy Makers Know What They Were Doing? Reassessing Fiscal Policy with Real Time Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 6758, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2008. "Sustainable fiscal policies and budgetary risk under alternative monetary policy arrangements," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 1-28, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2005. "In Praise of Fiscal Restraint and Debt Rules. What the Euro Zone Might Do Now," CEPR Discussion Papers 5043, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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