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Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking

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Author Info
Berger, Helge
Woitek, Ulrich

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Abstract

The empirical literature on central banking has found measures of central bank independence/conservatism to be negatively correlated with inflation and inflation variance across countries. But the cross-country approach has been criticised for its focus on policy outcomes instead of policies, and for the unsystematic conflation of the concepts of independence and conservatism. We avoid these shortcomings by estimating a single-country time series model for the German Bundesbank. We find that an increase in central bank conservatism leads to higher short-term interest rates and a more activist stabilisation policy with respect to macroeconomic shocks. More conservative Bundesbank regimes are associated with a less volatile economy, higher output and somewhat lower inflation. We also investigate the interaction between the central bank and the government. It turns out that non-conservative Bundesbank Councils react more strongly to macroeconomic shocks under conservative than under non-conservative government regimes.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 190.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_190

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Related research
Keywords: Central Bank Independence and Conservatism; Monetary Policy; Central Bank Government Relations; Generalised Impulse Responses;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions
E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization

References listed on IDEAS
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Miguel Rueda, 2008. "Breaking Credibility in Monetary Policy: The Role of Politics in the Stability of the Central Banker," RES Working Papers 4585, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  2. Helge Berger & Jakob Haan, 2002. "Are small countries too powerful within the ECB?," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(3), pages 263-282, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Miguel Rueda, 2008. "Credibilidad en la política monetaria: Papel de políticas en la estabilidad del Presidente del Banco Central," RES Working Papers 4586, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  4. Helge Berger & Thomas Harjes, 2009. "Does Global Liquidity Matter for Monetary Policy in the Euro Area?," IMF Working Papers 09/17, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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