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A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles

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  • Sieg, Gernot

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  • Sieg, Gernot, 1997. "A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 503-516, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:13:y:1997:i:3:p:503-516
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    1. Hibbs, Douglas A., 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1467-1487, December.
    2. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jurgen & Waller, Christopher J, 1997. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 378-393, April.
    3. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
    4. Hibbs, Douglas Jr., 1992. "Partisan theory after fifteen years," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 361-373, October.
    5. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    6. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
    7. Gartner, Manfred, 1994. "The quest for political cycles in OECD economies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-440, October.
    8. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 663-688.
    9. Masciandaro, Donato & Spinelli, Franco, 1994. "Central Banks' Independence: Institutional Determinants, Rankings and Central Bankers' Views," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 41(4), pages 434-443, November.
    10. Fischer, Stanley, 1995. "Central-Bank Independence Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 201-206, May.
    11. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 1-10, December.
    12. William D. Nordhaus, 1989. "Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(2), pages 1-68.
    13. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 191-205, February.
    14. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John A, 1992. "Reliable and Unreliable Partisan Appointees to the Board of Governors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 397-417, June.
    15. Schultz, Kenneth A., 1995. "The Politics of the Political Business Cycle," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 79-99, January.
    16. Gartner, Manfred, 1994. "Democracy, elections, and macroeconomic policy: Two decades of progress," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 85-109, May.
    17. Berger, Helge & Woitek, Ulrich, 1997. "How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 807-821, December.
    18. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
    19. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "Reply to Berger and Woitek," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 823-827, December.
    20. Berger, Helge & Woitek, Ulrich, 1997. "Searching for Political Business Cycles in Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 179-197, April.
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