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Central Banks' Independence: Institutional Determinants, Rankings and Central Bankers' Views

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  • Masciandaro, Donato
  • Spinelli, Franco

Abstract

Over the last few years, it has been shown that the institutional constraints on central banks' behavior matter a lot. This paper supplements the existing literature by supplying a detailed listing and an appropriate grouping of the many constraints that have been considered so far; a ranking of all central banks of OECD countries according to their degrees of independence of governments; and the results of an inquiry into the relevance that central bankers themselves attach to such matters. Copyright 1994 by Scottish Economic Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Scottish Economic Society in its journal Scottish Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 41 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 434-43

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Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:41:y:1994:i:4:p:434-43

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Cited by:
  1. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
  2. David Cobham & Stefania Cosci & Fabrizio Mattesini, 2008. "Informal central bank independence: an analysis for three European countries," CEIS Research Paper 116, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 14 Jul 2008.
  3. Eduard Hochreiter & Tadeusz Kowalski, 2000. "Central banks in European emerging market economies in the 1990s," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 53(212), pages 45-70.
  4. Vaubel, Roland, 1999. "The Future of the Euro : A Public Choice Perspective," Discussion Papers 570, Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre.
  5. Femke Esch & Eelke Jong, 2013. "Institutionalisation without internalisation. The cultural dimension of French-German conflicts on European Central Bank independence," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 631-648, December.
  6. Marc Quintyn, 2009. "Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 267-295, September.
  7. Donato Masciandaro, 1995. "Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-410, October.
  8. Sieg, Gernot, 1997. "A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 503-516, September.

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