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A political business cycle with boundedly rational agents

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  • Sieg, Gernot

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  • Sieg, Gernot, 2001. "A political business cycle with boundedly rational agents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 39-52, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:39-52
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    1. Hibbs, Douglas A., 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1467-1487, December.
    2. Suzuki, Motoshi, 1994. "Evolutionary Voter Sophistication and Political Business Cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(3-4), pages 241-261, December.
    3. Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 1997. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-14, November.
    4. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1994. "The VP-Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 213-245, June.
    5. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
    6. Thomas Brenner, 1998. "Can evolutionary algorithms describe learning processes?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 271-283.
    7. Herbert A. Simon, 1955. "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 69(1), pages 99-118.
    8. Radner, Roy & Rothschild, Michael, 1975. "On the allocation of effort," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 358-376, June.
    9. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
    10. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
    11. Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1985. "Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 708-720, September.
    12. Holland, John H & Miller, John H, 1991. "Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 365-371, May.
    13. Witt, Ulrich, 1986. "Firms' market behavior under imperfect information and economic natural selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 265-290, September.
    14. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    15. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 191-205, February.
    16. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-881, September.
    17. Arthur, W Brian, 1993. "On Designing Economic Agents That Behave Like Human Agents," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-22, February.
    18. Gartner, Manfred, 1994. "Democracy, elections, and macroeconomic policy: Two decades of progress," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 85-109, May.
    19. Sieg, Gernot, 1997. "A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 503-516, September.
    20. Heiner, Ronald A, 1983. "The Origin of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 560-595, September.
    21. Lane, David A, 1993. "Artificial Worlds and Economics, Part I," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 89-107, May.
    22. Berger, Helge & Woitek, Ulrich, 1997. "How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 807-821, December.
    23. Dennis Mueller, 1986. "Rational egoism versus adaptive egoism as fundamental postulate for a descriptive theory of human behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 3-23, January.
    24. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
    25. Chris Birchenhall & Nikos Kastrinos & Stan Metcalfe, 1997. "Genetic algorithms in evolutionary modelling," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 375-393.
    26. Herbert Dawid, 1996. "Learning of cycles and sunspot equilibria by Genetic Algorithms (*)," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 361-373.
    27. Lane, David A, 1993. "Artificial Worlds and Economics, Part II," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 177-197, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Salvatore Barbaro, 2002. "The Distributional Impact of Subsidies to Higher Education - Empirical Evidence from Germany," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 59(4), pages 458-478, December.
    2. Corinna Ahlfeld, 2009. "The scapegoat of heterogeneity - How fragmentation influences political decisionmaking," Departmental Discussion Papers 143, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    3. Binswanger, Johannes & Prüfer, Jens, 2012. "Democracy, populism, and (un)bounded rationality," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 358-372.
    4. Thies Büttner & Robert Schwager, 2003. "Regionale Verteilungseffekte der Hochschulfinanzierung und ihre Konsequenzen," Departmental Discussion Papers 119, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    5. Salvatore Barbaro & Jens Südekum, 2004. "Reforming a complicated income tax system: The political economics perspective," Departmental Discussion Papers 120, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    6. Petra Enß & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Kommunaler Finanzausgleich und Gewerbesteuerhebesätze in Niedersachsen," Departmental Discussion Papers 127, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    7. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Marco Di Pietro & Enrico Saltari & Willi Semmler, 2018. "Public debt stabilization: the relevance of policymakers’ time horizons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(3), pages 287-299, December.
    8. Gebhard Kirchgassner, 2002. "The effects of fiscal institutions on public finance: a survey of the empirical evidence," Chapters, in: Stanley L. Winer & Hirofumi Shibata (ed.), Political Economy and Public Finance, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Renate Ohr, 2009. "European Monetary Union at Ten: Had the German Maastricht Critics Been Wrong?," Departmental Discussion Papers 141, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    10. Salvatore Barbaro, 2003. "The Combined Effect of Taxation and Subsidization on Human Capital Investment," Departmental Discussion Papers 116, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    11. Findley, T. Scott, 2015. "Hyperbolic memory discounting and the political business cycle," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 345-359.
    12. Economides, George & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Price, Simon, 2003. "How elections affect fiscal policy and growth: revisiting the mechanism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 777-792, November.

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