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On the Assessment and Implementation of 'Institutional' Remedies

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Author Info
Forder, James

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Abstract

The most common approach to testing for the benefits of central-bank independence is argued to be methodologically flawed for the reason that the measure of independence does not permit a test of the hypothesis which suggests that these benefits exist. Particular doubt is cast on the merits of proposals to legislate to create independence. The argument is elucidated by comparison with the testing of a hypothesis about the benefits of centralized and decentralized unions. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 48 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 39-51
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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:48:y:1996:i:1:p:39-51

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  1. Kees Bouwman & Richard Jong-A-Pin & Jakob de Haan, 2005. "On the relationship between central bank independence and inflation: some more bad news," Applied Financial Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 1(6), pages 381-385, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jorg Bibow, . "Reflections on the Current Fashion for Central Bank Independence," Economics Working Paper Archive 334, Levy Economics Institute, The. [Downloadable!]
  3. Peter Skott, . "Wage Formation and the (Non-)Existence of the NAIRU," Economics Working Papers 1998-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  4. James Forder, 2002. "Interests and 'Independence': the European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 51-69, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. James Forder, 2000. "Traps in the Measurement of Independence and Accountability of Central Banks," Economics Series Working Papers 023, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. PANAGIOTIDIS, Theodore & TRIAMPELLA, Afroditi, 2006. "Central Bank Independence and inflation: the case of Greece," REVISTA DE ECONOMÍA DEL ROSARIO, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO - FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Haan, J. de & Amtenbrink, F. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1998. "Accountability of central banks : aspects and quantification," Discussion Paper 54, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan, 1997. "A State within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  9. Helge Berger & Ulrich Woitek, . "Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking," Working Papers 9814, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, revised May 1999. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Jakob de Haan, 2007. "Does High Inflation Cause Central Bankers to Lose their Job? Evidence Based on a New Data Set," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Jörg Bibow, 2001. "Reflections on the Current Fashion For Central Bank Independence," Macroeconomics 0108004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  12. Andreas Freytag & Friedrich Schneider, 2007. "Monetary Commitment, Institutional Constraints and Inflation: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1970s," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Sturm, Jan-Egbert & de Haan, Jakob, 2001. "Inflation in Developing Countries: Does Central Bank Independence Matter?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov & Hellström, Jörgen & Landström, Mats, 2009. "Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?," Ratio Working Papers 143, The Ratio Institute. [Downloadable!]
  15. Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov & Hellström, Jörgen & Landström, Mats, 2008. "Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 733, Umeå University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov & de Luna, Xavier, 2002. "Central Bank Independence and Price Stability: Evidence from 23 OECD-countries," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 589, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 12 Jun 2003. [Downloadable!]
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