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The Trade off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness

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  • Eijffinger, Sylvester C W
  • Hoeberichts, Marco

Abstract

This paper introduces a parameter for central bank independence in a monetary policy game with a conservative central banker. It tries to explain the optimal degree of central bank independence and conservativeness by four economic and political determinants, both theoretically and empirically. There appears to be a trade-off between central bank independence and conservativeness. Then, by comparing the optimal degree of conservativeness and independence with the actual degree of independence, the authors want to identify the optimal degree of conservativeness for twelve member states of the European Union. Copyright 1998 by Royal Economic Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 50 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 397-411

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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:50:y:1998:i:3:p:397-411

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  1. Sylvester Eijffinger & Eric Schaling, 1995. "Optimal Commitment in an Open Economy: Credibility vs. Flexibility," Bank of England working papers, Bank of England 41, Bank of England.
  2. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1992. "Central bank independence: Criteria and indices," Research Memorandum, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 548, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  3. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1995. "The ultimate determinants of central bank independence," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1995-5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  5. Aigner, Dennis J. & Hsiao, Cheng & Kapteyn, Arie & Wansbeek, Tom, 1984. "Latent variable models in econometrics," Handbook of Econometrics, Elsevier, in: Z. Griliches† & M. D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 1321-1393 Elsevier.
  6. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Keulen, M. van, 1994. "Central bank independence in another eleven countries," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1994-94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1993. "Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-152908, Tilburg University.
  8. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  9. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Manfred Neumann, 1991. "Precommitment by central bank independence," Open Economies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 95-112, June.
  11. de Haan, Jakob & van 't Hag, Gert Jan, 1995. " Variation in Central Bank Independence across Countries: Some Provisional Empirical Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 335-51, December.
  12. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March.
  13. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 10, December.
  14. Haizhou Huang & Michele Fratianni, 1995. "Central Bank Reputation and Conservativeness," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group dp216, Financial Markets Group.
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