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The Trade off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Eijffinger, Sylvester C W
Hoeberichts, Marco
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This paper introduces a parameter for central bank independence in a monetary policy game with a conservative central banker. It tries to explain the optimal degree of central bank independence and conservativeness by four economic and political determinants, both theoretically and empirically. There appears to be a trade-off between central bank independence and conservativeness. Then, by comparing the optimal degree of conservativeness and independence with the actual degree of independence, the authors want to identify the optimal degree of conservativeness for twelve member states of the European Union. Copyright 1998 by Royal Economic Society.
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Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers .
Volume (Year): 50 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 397-411
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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:50:y:1998:i:3:p:397-411Contact details of provider: Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK Fax: 01865 267 985 Email: Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Eijffinger, S. & Schaling, E., 1995.
"The Ultimate Determinants of Central Bank Independence ,"
Discussion Paper
5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985.
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Lohmann, Susanne, 1992.
"Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March.
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Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995.
"The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence ,"
Papers
9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
Other versions: Sylvester Eijffinger & Eric Schaling, .
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Bank of England working papers
41, Bank of England.
Other versions: de Haan, Jakob & van 't Hag, Gert Jan, 1995.
" Variation in Central Bank Independence across Countries: Some Provisional Empirical Evidence ,"
Public Choice ,
Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 335-51, December.
Haizhou Huang & Michele Fratianni, 1995.
"Central Bank Reputation and Conservativeness ,"
FMG Discussion Papers
dp216, Financial Markets Group.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Berger, Helge & Woitek, Ulrich, 1999.
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"The political economy of monetary policy conduct and central bank design ,"
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2006-25, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
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Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001.
"Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination ,"
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Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Weymark, Diana, 2002.
"Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Other versions:
Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002.
"Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics, and Central Bank Design ,"
Working Papers
0202, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
[Downloadable!] Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2005.
"Independence Before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design ,"
German Economic Review ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, 02.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Moser, Christoph / Dreher, Axel, 2007.
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Other versions: Diana N. Weymark, 2005.
"Inflation, Government Transfers, and Optimal Central Bank Independence ,"
Working Papers
0502, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
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Ali al-Nowaihi & Paul Levine & Alex Mandilaras, 2006.
"Central Bank Independence and the `Free Lunch Puzzle': A New Perspective ,"
Department of Economics Discussion Papers
0806, Department of Economics, University of Surrey.
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Helmut Wagner, 2001.
"Implications of Globalization for Monetary Policy ,"
IMF Working Papers
01/184, International Monetary Fund.
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W.H. Verhagen & S.C.W. Eijffinger, 2001.
"Flexible Inflation Targeting under a Non-Linear Phillipscurve ,"
WO Research Memoranda (discontinued)
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Other versions: Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2004.
"Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker ,"
Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2004
85, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
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Other versions: Manfred Gärtner, 2002.
"Monetary policy and central bank behaviour ,"
University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002
2002-24, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
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