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A Note on Post-Modern Monetary Policy

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  • Thierry Warin

Abstract

This paper surveys the roots of the modern literature on monetary policy, and illustrates the convergence that occurs between open-economy approaches and the micro foundations of monetary policy. From the Banking School versus Currency School debate to the “credibility versus flexibility” refinement, monetary policy has a long history of scholarly works. Although it may be hard to imagine that there is still room for innovations, the current developments of the literature on open-economy monetary policy seem to spawn a new and essential branch.

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Warin, 2006. "A Note on Post-Modern Monetary Policy," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0617, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0617
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    File URL: http://www.middlebury.edu/services/econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/0617.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    : monetary policy; rules versus discretion; credibility versus flexibility; Banking School; Currency School;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • F0 - International Economics - - General

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