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Variation in Central Bank Independence across Countries: Some Provisional Empirical Evidence

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Author Info
 de Haan, Jakob
van 't Hag, Gert Jan

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Abstract

In this paper seven hypotheses to explain variation in central bank independence across countries are tested. The predictions based upon the theory that delegation of authority by politicians to the central bank is used as a commitment device are not supported: central bank independence is not higher the larger the employment motivated inflationary bias, the higher political instability or the larger the government debt. Central bank independence is positively related to historical inflation experience and negatively with political instability. We do only find limited support for the view that countries with a universal banking system and countries whose central banks do not regulate financial institutions have more independent central banks. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 85 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
Pages: 335-51
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:85:y:1995:i:3-4:p:335-51

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  1. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Eijffinger, S. & Schaling, E., 1995. "The Ultimate Determinants of Central Bank Independence," Discussion Paper 5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Marc Quintyn, 2009. "Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 267-295, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M., 1996. "The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness," Discussion Paper 44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Eijffinger, S. & Schaling, E., 1995. "Optimal Commitment in an Open Economy : Credibility vs. Flexibility," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Hasan , Iftekhar & Mester, Loretta, 2008. "Central bank institutional structure and effective central banking: cross-country empirical evidence," Research Discussion Papers 29/2008, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan, 1997. "A State within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov & Hellström, Jörgen & Landström, Mats, 2008. "Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 733, Umeå University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Stefan Krause & Fabio Mendez, 2005. "Institutions, Arrangements, and Preferences for Inflation Stability: Evidence and Lessons from a Panel Data Analysis," Emory Economics 0501, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
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