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An independent central bank faced with elected governments

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Author Info
Demertzis, Maria
Hughes Hallett, Andrew
Viegi, Nicola

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Abstract

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 20 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 907-922
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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:20:y:2004:i:4:p:907-922

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 1998. "Independently Blue? Accountability and Independence in the New European Central Bank," CEPR Discussion Papers 1842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall. [Downloadable!]
  5. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    Other versions:
  6. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Mélitz, Jacques, 1997. "Some Cross-Country Evidence about Debt, Deficits and the Behaviour of Monetary and Fiscal Authorities," CEPR Discussion Papers 1653, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Leith, Campbell & Wren-Lewis, Simon, 2000. "Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages C93-108, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Fischer, Stanley, 1995. "Central-Bank Independence Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 201-06, May.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Viegi, Nicola, 2001. "Credibility, Transparency and Asymmetric Information in Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2671, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Andrew Hughes Hallett, 2005. "Political Devolution without Fiscal Devolution," Working Papers 0505, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Peter Bofinger & Eric Mayer, 2004. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in the Euro Area with different assumptions on the Phillips curve," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege) Discussion Papers 27, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research, University of Goettingen (Germany).. [Downloadable!]
  4. M. Demertzis & H.M.M. Peeters, 2001. "The role of fiscal policy in EMU: a simulation with EUROMON," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 653, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  5. Frank Bohn, 2006. "Greed, Impatience and Exchange Rate Determination," Working Papers 200605, School Of Economics, University College Dublin. [Downloadable!]
  6. Andrew Hallett & Nicola Viegi, 2002. "Inflation Targeting as a Coordination Device," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 341-362, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2002. "Policy Games and the Optimal Design of Central Banks," Working Papers 0220, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  8. M. Demertzis, 2001. "Low inflation at no cost? A numerical simulations exercise," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 72, Netherlands Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bas Van Aarle & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans & Arie Weeren, 2001. "Macroeconomic Policy Interaction under EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 29-60, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Alexander Mihailov & Katrin Ullrich, 2008. "Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees," Working Papers em-dp2008-72, School of Business, Reading University. [Downloadable!]
  11. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Maria Demertzis, . "When can an Independent Central Bank offer lower Inflation at no Cost? A Political Economy Analysis," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Diana N. Weymark, 2001. "The Cost of Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union," Working Papers 0128, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Viegi, Nicola, 2001. "Labour Market Reform and Monetary Policy in EMU: Do Asymmetries Matter?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2979, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Manfred Gärtner, 2006. "The political economy of monetary policy conduct and central bank design," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2006 2006-25, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
  15. Ullrich, Katrin, 2003. "Unabhängigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-65, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  16. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Enrico Marchetti, 2005. "Unions, fiscal policy and central bank transparency," Macroeconomics 0508004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Andrew Hughes Hallet & Jan Libich & Petr Stehlik, 2008. "Welfare Improving Coordination Of Fiscal And Monetary Policy," CAMA Working Papers 2008-04, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  18. Kerstin Bernoth & Andrew Hughes Hallet & John Lewis, 2008. "Did fiscal policy makers know what they were doing? Reassessing fiscal policy with real-time data," DNB Working Papers 169, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Ali al-Nowaihi & Paul Levine & Alex Mandilaras, 2006. "Central Bank Independence and the `Free Lunch Puzzle': A New Perspective," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 0806, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
  20. Buti, Marco & Sapir, André, 2001. "EMU in the Early Years: Differences and Credibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 2832, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. M. Demertzis, 2001. "Central Bank Independence: Low Inflation at no Cost? A Numeral Simulations Exercise," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 656, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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