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Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

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Author Info
Georgios Chortareas ()
Stephen Miller ()

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Abstract

This paper considers the contracting approach to centralbanking in a simple common agency model. We suggest thatcentral banker contracts that do not consider the possibilityof more than one principal existing are incomplete contracts.Such incomplete contracts can be a poor form ofmonetary policy delegation under common agency. We develop amodel with two principals – society (government) and ageneric interest group, whose objective conflicts withsociety’s ex ante preferences by incorporating an inflationarybias. We determine when the government-offered orinterest-group-offered contract dominates the central banker’sdecision. The results largely depend on whether theinterest-group-offered contract is written in terms of outputor inflation. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-004-6159-9
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 121 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 131-155
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:121:y:2004:i:1:p:131-155

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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  2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Eichengreen, B, 1996. "A More Perfect Union? The Logic of Economic Integration," Princeton Studies in International Economics 198, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
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  8. Gordon, Robert J, 1975. "The Demand for and Supply of Inflation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 807-36, December.
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  9. Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Seonghwan Oh, 1990. "Strategic discipline in monetary policy with private information: optimal targeting periods," Working Papers 1990-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
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  11. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2003. "Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs and Contract Targets," Bulletin of Economic Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(1), pages 101-112, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Habib Ahmed & Stephen M. Miller, 1996. "Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Multisectorial Economies," Working papers 1996-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Christopher J. Waller, 1995. "Performance contracts for central bankers," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 3-14. [Downloadable!]
  17. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1994. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," NBER Working Papers 4877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Waller, Christopher J, 1992. "The Choice of a Conservative Central Banker in a Multisector Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1006-12, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(4), pages 675-708, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Canzoneri, Matthew B & Nolan, Charles & Yates, Anthony, 1997. "Mechanisms for Achieving Monetary Stability: Inflation Targeting versus the ERM," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(1), pages 46-60, February.
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  22. Avinash Dixit, 1996. "Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 375-388, Fall. [Downloadable!]
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  23. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, . "Does it pay to be transparent? International evidence from central bank forecasts," Bank of England working papers 143, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
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  24. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
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