Mechanisms for Achieving Monetary Stability: Inflation Targeting versus the ERM
AbstractFirst, the authors modify the Barro-Gordon model so that a credibility-stabilization trade-off will remain, even when a performance contract of the type envisaged by Carl Walsh (1995) is imposed on the central bank governor. They do this by modeling a real interest rate bias along with the inflation bias. Then, the authors discuss how various inflation penalties might actually be imposed on a central bank and ask whether 'inflation targeting' (supported by one or another of the penalties) is likely to bring a better resolution to the credibility-stabilization trade-off than the ERM. Copyright 1997 by Ohio State University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Volume (Year): 29 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879
Other versions of this item:
- Canzoneri, Matthew B & Nolan, Charles & Yates, Tony, 1996. "Mechanisms for Achieving Monetary Stability: Inflation Targeting Versus the ERM," CEPR Discussion Papers 1418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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