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Mechanisms for Achieving Monetary Stability: Inflation Targeting versus the ERM

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Author Info
Canzoneri, Matthew B
Nolan, Charles
Yates, Anthony

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Abstract

First, the authors modify the Barro-Gordon model so that a credibility-stabilization trade-off will remain, even when a performance contract of the type envisaged by Carl Walsh (1995) is imposed on the central bank governor. They do this by modeling a real interest rate bias along with the inflation bias. Then, the authors discuss how various inflation penalties might actually be imposed on a central bank and ask whether 'inflation targeting' (supported by one or another of the penalties) is likely to bring a better resolution to the credibility-stabilization trade-off than the ERM. Copyright 1997 by Ohio State University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 29 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 46-60
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Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:29:y:1997:i:1:p:46-60

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  1. Florin Ovidiu BILBIIE, 2001. "Inflation Contracts, Targets and Strategic Incentives for Delegation in International Monetary Policy Games," Economics Working Papers ECO2001/16, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  2. Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2000. "Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency," Working papers 2000-03, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Angelos Kanas & Georgios Tsiotas, 2005. "Real interest rates linkages between the USA and the UK in the postwar period," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(3), pages 251-262. [Downloadable!]
  4. Lars E.O. Svensson, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," NBER Working Papers 5251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Øistein RØisland & Ragnar Torvik, 2003. "Optimum Currency Areas Under Inflation Targeting," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 99-118, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Chadha, J.S. & Charles Nolan, 2002. "Inflation and Price Level Targeting in a New Keynesian Model," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0203, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Anton Muscatelli, 1996. "Political Consensus, Uncertain Preferences and Central Bank Independence," Working Papers 9615, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Nov 1996.
    Other versions:
  8. Chadha, J.S. & Nolan, C., 2003. "On the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0303, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  9. Chadha, J.S. & Charles Nolan, 2002. "Optimal Simple Rules for the Conduct of Monetary and Fiscal Policy," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0224, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Devine, Máiréad & McCoy, Daniel, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A Review of the Issues," Research Technical Papers 5/RT/97, Central Bank & Financial Services Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI). [Downloadable!]
  11. Alessandro Missale & Elisabetta Falcetti, . "Public Debt Indexation and Denomination with and Indipendent Central Bank," Working Papers 169, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Castrén, Olli, 1998. "Monetary Policy Delegation, Labour Market Structure and Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination," Research Discussion Papers 14/1998, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
  13. Matthew Canzoneri & Behzad Diba, 1999. "The Stability and Growth Pact: A Delicate Balance or an Albatross?," Empirica, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 241-258, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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