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Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed."

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Author Info
Spiller, Pablo T

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 33 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 65-101
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:33:y:1990:i:1:p:65-101

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  1. Stanley R. Johnson, 1995. "Managing Sustainable Development," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 95-wp135, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Estache, Antonio & Martimort, David, 1999. "Politics, transaction costs, and the design of regulatory institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2073, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tomaso Duso, 2002. "On the Politics of the Regulatory Reform: Econometric Evidence from the OECD Countries," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-07, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
  4. Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2000. "Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency," Working papers 2000-03, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Reuben E., 2002. "Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation," Public Economics 0212001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Eric Helland & Michael Sykuta, 2002. "Regulation and the Evolution of Corporate Boards: Monitoring, Advising or Window Dressing?," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2002-27, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  7. Antonio Lorenzo, 2003. "The Role of Interest Groups in the European Union Decision-Making Process," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 251-261, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rodrigo Moita & Claudio Paiva, 2006. "Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence," IMF Working Papers 06/260, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  9. Chen, Dong-Hua & Fan, Joseph P.H. & Wong, T.J., 2004. "Politically-connected CEOs, Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance of China's Partially Privatized Firms," CEI Working Paper Series 2004-5, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  10. Alberto Porto & Santiago Urbiztondo, 1993. "Regulación económica: un enfoque "principal-agente" de la relación entre el estado, el regulador y la empresa regulada," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 20(2 Year 19), pages 303-327, December. [Downloadable!]
  11. Pablo T. Spiller & Sanny Liao, 2006. "Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups' Participation in Policy Making - A Selective Survey," NBER Working Papers 12209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, daniel, 2000. ""Seize the state, seize the day": state capture, corruption, and influence in transition," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2444, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  13. Tomaso Duso, 2001. "Lobbying and Regulation in a Political Economy: Evidence from the US Cellular Industry," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-03, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Moita, Rodrigo M. & Paiva, Claudio, 2006. "Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence," Ibmec Working Papers wpe_53, Ibmec Working Paper, Ibmec São Paulo. [Downloadable!]
  15. William D. Savedoff, 1997. "Social Services Viewed Through New Lenses: Agency Problems in Education and Health in Latin America," RES Working Papers 3017, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  16. Santiago Urbiztondo & Fernando Navajas & Daniel Artana, 1998. "La autonomía de los entes reguladores argentinos: Agua y cloacas, gas natural, energía eléctrica y telecomunicaciones," RES Working Papers 3038, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  17. Maurice Kugler & Howard Rosental, 2000. "Checks and Balances: an assessment of the institutional separtion of political powers in Colombia," WORKING PAPERS SERIES. DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 002117, FEDESARROLLO. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Rodrigo Menon S. Moita & Claudio Paiva, 2006. "Political Price Cycles In Regulated Industries: Theory And Evidence," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 126, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
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