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Political Consensus, Uncertain Preferences and Central Bank Independence

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Author Info
Anton Muscatelli

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Abstract

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Glasgow in its series Working Papers with number 9615.

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Date of creation: Aug 1996
Date of revision: Nov 1996
Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:9615

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Web page: http://www.gla.ac.uk/departments/economics/
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jürgen & Waller, Christopher, 1993. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 752, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Al-Nowaihi, A & Levine, Paul L, 1996. "Independent but Accountable: Walsh Contracts and the Credibility Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 1387, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Muscatelli, Vito Antonio & Spinelli, Franco, 1996. "Gibson's Paradox and Policy Regimes: A Comparison of the Experience in the US, UK and Italy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 43(4), pages 468-92, September.
  8. Bordo Michael D. & Kydland Finn E., 1995. "The Gold Standard As a Rule: An Essay in Exploration," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 423-464, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Charles Nolan & Eric Schaling, . "Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Central Bank Accountability," Bank of England working papers 54, Bank of England.
  13. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Herrendorf, Berthold & Lockwood, Ben, 1996. "Rogoff's 'Conservative' Central Banker Restored," CEPR Discussion Papers 1386, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Michael D. Bordo & Finn E. Kydland, 1992. "The gold standard as a rule," Working Paper 9205, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Fregert, Klas & Jonung, Lars, 1996. "Inflation and Switches between Specie and Paper Standards in Sweden 1668-1931: A Public Finance Interpretation," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 43(4), pages 444-67, September.
  17. Waller, Christopher J., 1992. "A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 411-428, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Lossani, Marco & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 1998. "Incomplete Information in Monetary Policy Games: Rules Rather Than a Conservative Central Banker," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 45(1), pages 33-47, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Bennett T. McCallum, 1996. "Crucial Issues Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Canzoneri, Matthew B & Nolan, Charles & Yates, Tony, 1996. "Mechanisms for Achieving Monetary Stability: Inflation Targeting Versus the ERM," CEPR Discussion Papers 1418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Darby, Julia & Li, Chol-Won & Muscatelli, v: Anton, 2000. "Political Uncertainty, Public Expenditure and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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