Independent but Accountable: Walsh Contracts and the Credibility Problem
AbstractWalsh (1995) addresses the government-central bank principal-agent problem where there exists a severe information extraction problem. This is solved by a ‘Walsh contract’ which links the income of the central bank to observed macroeconomic variables, output and inflation. The contract does not solve the time-inconsistency problem, however. There will be circumstances where a renegotiation of the contract benefits all parties involved and non-renegotiation-proofness destroys its credibility as a commitment device. But the contract’s strength is that renegotiation can be very visible and this facilitates a reputational solution to the problem, set out in this paper.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1387.
Date of creation: Apr 1996
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