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Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Inflation Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?

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M. Lossani
P. Natale,
P. Tirelli

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Glasgow in its series Working Papers with number 9707.

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Date of creation: Jul 1997
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Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:9707

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  1. Al-Nowaihi, A & Levine, Paul L, 1996. "Independent but Accountable: Walsh Contracts and the Credibility Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 1387, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Herbertsson, Tryggvi Thor, 1996. "Does Inflation Matter for Growth?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1503, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Sweeney, Richard J, 1987. "Some Macro Implications of Risk," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(2), pages 222-34, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Musgrave, Richard A., 1985. "Excess bias and the nature of budget growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 287-308, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Svensson, L.E.O., 1993. "The Simplest Test of Inflation Target Credibility," Papers 560, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
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  10. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Alesina, Alberto & Roubini, Nouriel, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 663-88, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Christopher J. Waller, 1995. "Performance contracts for central bankers," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 3-14. [Downloadable!]
  13. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1995. "Political Economy of Monetary and Budgetary Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 427-39, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Mankiw, N. Gregory, 1987. "The optimal collection of seigniorage : Theory and evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 327-341, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 619-30, October.
  17. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Way of Precommitment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 431-48, July.
  19. Tabellini, Guido, 1986. "Money, debt and deficits in a dynamic game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 427-442, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. De Grauwe, Paul, 1996. "Inflation Targeting to Achieve Inflation Convergence in the Transition Towards EMU," CEPR Discussion Papers 1457, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Lindbeck, Assar, 1985. "Redistribution policy and the expansion of the public sector," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 309-328, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Ben S. Bernanke & Ilian Mihov, 1996. "What Does the Bundesbank Target?," NBER Working Papers 5764, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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