Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence
AbstractThis note uses information on a sample of sixteen OECD countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance. As previous work suggests, politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation. However, the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth, unemployment, or the ex ante real interest rate. Copyright 1993 by Ohio State University Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Volume (Year): 25 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879
You can help add them by filling out this form.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
by Martin FlodÃ©n in Ekonomistas on 2009-04-01 05:30:03
- Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability
by Guest Author in the big picture on 2010-05-31 12:30:15
- 'A Century of U.S. Central Banking: Goals, Frameworks, Accountability'
by Mark Thoma in Economist's View on 2013-07-10 13:48:26
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
- Structure of the Federal Reserve System in Wikipedia English ne '')
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.