Incomplete Information in Monetary Policy Games: Rules Rather Than a Conservative Central Banker
AbstractTime inconsistency in monetary policy can be addressed appointing a conservative central banker. But incomplete information about the central banker's preferences impairs the performance of delegation schemes. Firstly, the ensuing ex ante variability of monetary response lowers welfare. Secondly, partial independence schemes may prove inadequate because reputation--not only legal arrangements--defines the actual degree of independence. The incumbent may exploit his reputation to impose too conservative policies, whereas if he lacks reputation, partial independence forces him to accommodate. As a result, simple rules may be preferred. Copyright 1998 by Scottish Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Scottish Economic Society in its journal Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 45 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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- Chortareas, Georgios E & Miller, Stephen M, 2003.
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