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A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank

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Author Info
Waller, Christopher J.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBW-45F91PS-G/2/d30ec39a4f4fd676f424d425af6075b7
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 29 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 411-428
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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:29:y:1992:i:3:p:411-428

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

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  1. Manfred Neumann, 1991. "Precommitment by central bank independence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 95-112, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2004. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2004 85, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alan Blinder, 2006. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Why and How?," DNB Working Papers 092, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal Central Bank Design: Benchmarks for the ECB," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Dino Falaschetti, 2003. "Does Partisan Heritage Matter? The Case of the Federal Reserve," Microeconomics 0311003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. James Bullard & Christopher J. Waller, 2002. "Central bank design in general equilibrium," Working Papers 1998-002, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen. [Downloadable!]
  8. Carl E. Walsh, 1995. "Recent Central-Bank Reforms and the Role of Price Stability as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 237-252 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  9. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Christopher J. Waller, 1998. "Appointing the median voter of a policy board," Working Paper 9802, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  11. Anton Muscatelli, 1996. "Political Consensus, Uncertain Preferences and Central Bank Independence," Working Papers 9615, Department of Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Nov 1996.
    Other versions:
  12. Donato Masciandaro, 1995. "Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-410, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Jula, Dorin, 2008. "Economic Impact of Political Cycles – The Relevance of European experinces for Romania," Working Papers of Institute for Economic Forecasting 081101, Institute for Economic Forecasting. [Downloadable!]
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