This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jensen, Henrik
Abstract

While optimal monetary policy is subject to a credibility problem, it is often argued that the government should appoint a central banker whose incentives differ from the government's. The author argues, however, that such delegation does not overcome credibility problems given that delegation is discretionary and without costs. 'Reappointment costs' of delegation are shown to improve suboptimal outcomes but credibility of optimal monetary policy turns out be worsened. At best, delegation therefore has no effects on credibility, but only if reappointment has no costs. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199712%2987%3A5%3C911%3ACOOMD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 87 (1997)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 911-20
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:87:y:1997:i:5:p:911-20

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Florin Bilbiie, 2005. "The Utopia of Implementing Monetary Policy Cooperation through Domestic Institutions," Economics Papers 2005-W13, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
  2. Zeno Rotondi & John Driffill, 2003. "Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 292, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Philip Schellekens, 2000. "Caution and conservatism in the making of monetary policy," Working Paper Series 25, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Avinash Dixit & Henrik Jensen, 2000. "Equilibrium Contracts for the Central Bank of a Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  6. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1998. "Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules," Working Papers 1995-015, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Francesco Salsano, 2005. "Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0523, Birkbeck, School of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ullrich, Katrin, 2003. "Unabhängigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-65, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  10. Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2002. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Working papers 2002-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Johansson, Åsa, 2002. "The Interaction Between Labor Market Policy and Monetary Policy: An Analysis of Time Inconsistency Problems," Seminar Papers 708, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
  12. Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2005. "Structural Reforms and the Exchange Rate Regime A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 263/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Florin Bilbiie, 2005. "Deus ex machina wanted: time inconsistency of time consistency solutions in monetary policy," Economics Papers 2005-W10, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
  14. Spagnolo, G., 1999. "Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9913, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  15. Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2007. "The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions: Theory and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 07/171, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  16. Henrik Jensen, 2002. "Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 928-956, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Grischa Perino, 2008. "How Delegation Improves Commitment," Working Papers 0466, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2008. [Downloadable!]
  18. Xavier Debrun & Francesca Castellani, 2001. "Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions," IMF Working Papers 01/205, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  19. Bard Hastad, 2007. "Strategic Delegation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 1442, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  20. John Driffill & Zeno Rotondi, 2006. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1361-1366, September.
  21. Keffer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2000. "Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions: when are independent central banks irrelevent?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2356, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  22. Aidt, T. & Magris, F., 2003. "Capital Taxation and Electoral Accountability," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0318, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There is a FAQ (frequently asked questions).

This page was last updated on 2008-8-11.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.