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Citations for "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation"

by Jensen, Henrik

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  1. Florin Bilbiie, 2005. "Deus ex machina wanted: time inconsistency of time consistency solutions in monetary policy," Economics Papers 2005-W10, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  2. Lossani, Marco & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2000. "Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matters?," MPRA Paper 18693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Xavier Debrun, 2011. "Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies," IMF Working Papers 11/173, International Monetary Fund.
  4. Michael Berlemann, 2005. "Time inconsistency of monetary policy: Empirical evidence from polls," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 1-15, July.
  5. Johansson, Åsa, 2002. "The Interaction Between Labor Market Policy and Monetary Policy: An Analysis of Time Inconsistency Problems," Seminar Papers 708, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  6. Hans Gersbach & Verena Liessem, 2008. "Reelection threshold contracts in politics," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 233-255, August.
  7. M. Lossani & P. Natale, & P. Tirelli, 1997. "Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Inflation Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?," Working Papers 9707, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  8. Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2000. "Uncovering financial markets' beliefs about inflation targets," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(5), pages 483-512.
  9. Belke, Ansgar & Herz, Bernhard & Vogel, Lukas, 2005. "Structural Reforms and the Exchange Rate Regime: A Panel Analysis for the World versus OECD Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 1798, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Keffer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2000. "Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions: when are independent central banks irrelevent?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2356, The World Bank.
  11. Georgios Chortareas & Stephen Miller, 2004. "Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 131-155, October.
  12. Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter, 1998. "Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules," Working Papers 1995-015, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  13. Aidt, Toke S. & Magris, Francesco, 2006. "Capital taxation and electoral accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 277-291, June.
  14. Ullrich, Katrin, 2003. "Unabhängigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-65, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  15. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
  16. Rotondi, Zeno, 2000. "Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0003, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  17. Henrik Jensen, 2002. "Targeting Nominal Income Growth or Inflation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 928-956, September.
  18. Gersbach, Hans & Liessem, Verena, 2008. "Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 401-411, November.
  19. Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller, 2009. "Implementing Optimal Monetary Policy: Objectives and Rules," Working Papers 0911, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics.
  20. Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2001. "Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions," IMF Working Papers 01/205, International Monetary Fund.
  21. Masson, Paul R. & Shukayev, Malik D., 2011. "Are bygones not bygones? Modeling price-level targeting with an escape clause and lessons from the gold standard," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 162-175, June.
  22. Basso, Henrique S, 2008. "Delegation, Time Inconsistency and Sustainable Equilibrium," Working Paper Series 2008:15, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  23. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
  24. Florin Bilbiie, 2005. "The Utopia of Implementing Monetary Policy Cooperation through Domestic Institutions," Economics Papers 2005-W13, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  25. Muscatelli, Vito A. & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2012. "A simple and flexible alternative to Stability and Growth Pact deficit ceilings. Is it at hand?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 14-26.
  26. Zeno Rotondi & John Driffill, 2003. "Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 292, Society for Computational Economics.
  27. Jensen, Henrik, 2000. "Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 517-539, March.
  28. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2012. "Inflation Forecast Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 8933, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  29. Francisco J. Ruge-Murciá, 2002. "A Prudent Central Banker," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(3), pages 7.
  30. Avinash Dixit & Henrik Jensen, 2000. "Equilibrium Contracts for the Central Bank of a Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 400, CESifo Group Munich.
  31. Goyal, Ashima, 2002. "Coordinating monetary and fiscal policies: a role for rules?," MPRA Paper 29200, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  32. Bernd Hayo & Carsten Hefeker, 2001. "Do We Really Need Central Bank Independence? A Critical Re- examination," Macroeconomics 0103006, EconWPA.
  33. Bendor, J. & Glazer, A. & Hammond, T.H., 2000. "Theories of Delegation in Political Science," Papers 00-01-14, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  34. Bar-Ilan, Avner & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2006. "Endogenous contract structure and monetary policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 1043-1060, May.
  35. Moser, Peter, 1999. "Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1569-1593, August.
  36. Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2007. "The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions," IMF Working Papers 07/171, International Monetary Fund.
  37. Harstad, Bård, 2010. "Strategic delegation and voting rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 102-113, February.
  38. Perino, Grischa, 2010. "How delegation improves commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 137-139, February.
  39. Bilbiie, Florin Ovidiu, 2009. "Delegating Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," CEPR Discussion Papers 7482, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  40. Schellekens, Philip, 2000. "Caution and conservatism in the making of monetary policy," Working Paper Series 0025, European Central Bank.
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  42. Francesco Salsano, 2005. "Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0523, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
  43. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2274, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  44. John Driffill & Zeno Rotondi, 2006. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1361-1366, September.
  45. Georgios E. Chortareas & Stephen M. Miller, 2002. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Working papers 2002-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  46. Spagnolo, G., 1999. "Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9913, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.