Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 96 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lars E.O. Svensson, 1997.
"Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts,"
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5251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
- Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Svensson, L.E.O., 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," Papers 595, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Bennett T. McCallum, 1996.
"Crucial Issues Concerning Central Bank Independence,"
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5597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
- McCallum, Bennett T, 1995.
"Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-11, May.
- Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jensen, Henrik, 1997. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 911-20, December.
- Paul R. Masson & Malik D. Shukayev, 2008.
"Are Bygones not Bygones? Modeling Price Level Targeting with an Escape Clause and Lessons from the Gold Standard,"
08-27, Bank of Canada.
- Masson, Paul R. & Shukayev, Malik D., 2011. "Are bygones not bygones? Modeling price-level targeting with an escape clause and lessons from the gold standard," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 162-175, June.
- Basso, Henrique S., 2009.
"Delegation, time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1617-1629, August.
- Basso, Henrique S, 2008. "Delegation, Time Inconsistency and Sustainable Equilibrium," Working Paper Series 2008:15, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
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