Theories of Delegation in Political Science
AbstractWe survey modern models of delegation which assume that a boss and subordinate pursue their own goals. Among the major themes covered are thefolling: the conditions under which the boss will prefer to delegate versus those in which she will prefer to retain authority; the ways in which a boss can induce a subordinate to truthfully reveal information; when rational principals will use the ally principle; delegation in repeated interactions; and the ways in which delegation can overcome committment problems.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by California Irvine - School of Social Sciences in its series Papers with number 00-01-14.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A.
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Other versions of this item:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jensen, Henrik, 1997. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 911-20, December.
- Cremer, Jacques, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49, February.
- Phongthorn Wrasai & Otto H. Swank, 2004. "Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 09 Dec 2004.
- Frederick J. Boehmke & Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, 2005. "Whose Ear (or Arm) to Bend? Information Sources and Venue Choice in Policy Making," Public Economics 0502009, EconWPA.
- Phongthorn Wrasai & Otto H. Swank, 2004.
"Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
04-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 09 Dec 2004.
- John Nye, 2007. "Killing Private Ryan: An Institutional Analysis of Military Decision Making in World War II," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 281-308, September.
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