This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Spagnolo, G.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

How many international agreements should there be, and who should sign them? When policy issues are separable, linking them in a ‘grand international agreement’ facilitates policy cooperation by reallocating slack enforcement power. When policy issues are substitutes, issue linkage further facilitates policy cooperation by increasing the amount of available enforcement power. The contrary happens when issues are complements. Then a better strategy can be to delegate policy issues to diferent independent national agencies. Constitutional rules that permit credible delegation to agents with dfferent objectives from governments facilitate international cooperation by generating stronger credible threats. Implications for multilateral agreements are discussed.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/repec/cam/pdf/wp9913.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 9913.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:9913

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Howard Cobb).

Related research
Keywords: International agreements; Policy cooperation; Policy coordination; Cross-border spillovers; International institutions;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Sobel, Joel, 1981. "Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 597-619, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1995. "R&D Cooperation and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 1154, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dolado, Juan J. & Dolado, Juan J. & Griffiths, Mark & Padilla, A. Jorge & Padilla, A. Jorge, 1994. "Delegation in international monetary policy games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1057-1069, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Michael L. Katz, 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. McCallum, Bennett T, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-11, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Dewatripont, Mathias, 1988. "Commitment through Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Third Parties," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(3), pages 377-89, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Robert W. Staiger, 1994. "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 4962, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 206-217, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Jensen, Henrik, 1997. "Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 911-20, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Crawford, Vincent P. & Varian, Hal R., 1979. "Distortion of preferences and the Nash theory of bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 203-206. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Currie, David & Levine, Paul & Pearlman, Joseph, 1996. "The Choice of 'Conservative' Bankers in Open Economies: Monetary Regime Options for Europe," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 345-58, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1987. "International Policy Coordination: The Case of the Developing Country Debt Crisis," NBER Working Papers 2287, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Dale W. Henderson, 1991. "Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies: A Game-Theoretic Approach," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031787.
  21. Riezman, Raymond, 1991. "Dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3-4), pages 267-283, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Anderlini, L. & Felli, L., 1999. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9910, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Drusilla K. Brown & Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, 2001. "Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on the International Trade Agenda?," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0113, Department of Economics, Tufts University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1999. "Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty and International Economic Institutions," NBER Working Papers 7293, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2000. "GATT-Think," NBER Working Papers 8005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2002. "GATT-think," Discussion Papers 0102-39, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Andriamananjara, Soamiely & Schiff, Maurice, 1998. "Regional groupings among microstates," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1922, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Springer Verlag was the first commercial publisher to be listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.