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Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains

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  • Irmen, Andreas

Abstract

The design of distribution channels is an important marketing decision since a revision implies costly reorganization. Hence, it makes sense to study strategic motives of alternative distribution devices. A precommitment is a strategic move that affects the other players' expectations on how oneself will behave and thus induces them to choose in one's own favor (Schelling, 1960). How these tactics can be used by firms to favorably influence competition between vertical chains is the topic of the literature reviewed in this survey. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economic Surveys.

Volume (Year): 12 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 333-59

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:12:y:1998:i:4:p:333-59

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Cited by:
  1. Fumagalli, Chiara & Motta, Massimo, 2001. "Upstream mergers, downstream mergers, and secret vertical contracts," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 275-289, September.
  2. Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright, 2011. "Vertical Limit pricing," Working Papers 1104E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  3. Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel & Vettas, Nikolaos, 2003. "Endogenous Contracts Under Bargaining in Competing Vertical Chains," CEPR Discussion Papers 3976, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. George Symeonidis, 2009. "Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly," Economics Discussion Papers 671, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  5. Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2007. "Upstream horizontal mergers, vertical contracts, and bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 963-987, October.
  6. Chris Doyle & Martijn A. Han, 2012. "Cartelization Through Buyer Groups," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2012-059, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  7. Oystein Foros & Hans Jarle Kind, 2006. "Do Slotting Allowances Harm Retail Competition?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1800, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. José J. Sempere Monerris & Rafael Moner Colonques & Amparo Urbano, 2000. "Product Quality And Distribution Channels," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-19, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  9. Tommaso Valletti, 2000. "Switching Costs in Vertically Related Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 395-409, December.

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