Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains
AbstractThe design of distribution channels is an important marketing decision since a revision implies costly reorganization. Hence, it makes sense to study strategic motives of alternative distribution devices. A precommitment is a strategic move that affects the other players' expectations on how oneself will behave and thus induces them to choose in one's own favor (Schelling, 1960). How these tactics can be used by firms to favorably influence competition between vertical chains is the topic of the literature reviewed in this survey. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economic Surveys.
Volume (Year): 12 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
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Other versions of this item:
- Andreas IRMEN, 1996. "Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9617, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
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