Delegation in international monetary policy games
AbstractIn this paper we show that the delegation of monetary policy to an independent and more conservative central banker is an optimal policy in an international context with monetary spillovers between countries, even in the absence of time inconsistency (credibility) issues. We also study the welfare implications of delegating monetary policy and extend our analysis to incorporate the coordination of monetary policies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 38 (1994)
Issue (Month): 5 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Other versions of this item:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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- Agiomirgianakis, George & Zervoyianni, Athina, 2001. "Globalization of labor markets and macroeconomic equilibrium," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 109-133.
- Campoy, Juan Cristobal & Negrete, Juan Carlos, 2007. "A decentralized and state-independent mechanism for internalizing international monetary policy spillovers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(3), pages 326-331, March.
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- Fatum, Rasmus, 2006. "One monetary policy and 18 central bankers: The European monetary policy as a game of strategic delegation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 659-669, May.
- Joseph Daniels & David VanHoose, 1998. "Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 265-284, July.
- Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 2002. "Delegation and Fiscal Policy in the Open Economy: More Bad News for Rogoff's Delegation Game," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 153-174, April.
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