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On the determinants of Central Bank independence in open economies Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Marcello D'Amato (Università di Salerno, Csef, Celpe, Italy)
Barbara Pistoresi (Università di Modena e Reggio Emila, ReCent, Italy)
Francesco Salsano
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We test some positive implications of the commitment hypothesis for the design of monetary institutions in open economies, by studying the determinants of Central Bank independence on a sample of 55 countries, for the period 1980-1989. We document fairly consistent empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that strategic commitment is indeed important to understand cross-country variation in the level of Central Bank degree of dependence. We also address the related question why only highly industrialized countries have relied on such a solution to the inflationary bias of monetary policy whereas other countries have not. Data suggest that the answer is related to the presence and the size of world-wide common features in the business cycle at country level. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal International Journal of Finance & Economics .
Volume (Year): 14 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 107-119
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Handle: RePEc:ijf:ijfiec:v:14:y:2009:i:2:p:107-119Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.interscience.wiley.com/jpages/1076-9307/
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Keywords: References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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