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One monetary policy and 18 central bankers: The European monetary policy as a game of strategic delegation

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  • Fatum, Rasmus

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 53 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (May)
Pages: 659-669

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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:53:y:2006:i:4:p:659-669

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

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  1. Wacziarg, Romain & Alesina, Alberto, 1999. "Is Europe Going Too Far?," Scholarly Articles 4553012, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Rudiger Dornbusch & Carlo A. Favero & Francesco Giavazzi, 1998. "The Immediate Challenges for the European Central Bank," NBER Working Papers 6369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Dolado, Juan J. & Dolado, Juan J. & Griffiths, Mark & Padilla, A. Jorge & Padilla, A. Jorge, 1994. "Delegation in international monetary policy games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1057-1069, May.
  4. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1993. "A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 195-209, June.
  5. Debrun, Xavier, 2001. "Bargaining over EMU vs. EMS: Why Might the ECB Be the Twin Sister of the Bundesbank?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 566-90, July.
  6. Ellen E. Meade & D. Nathan Sheets, 2002. "Regional influences on U.S. monetary policy: some implications for Europe," International Finance Discussion Papers 721, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  7. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  8. Aksoy, Yunus & De Grauwe, Paul & Dewachter, Hans, 2002. "Do asymmetries matter for European monetary policy?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 443-469, March.
  9. Kiel, Alexandra & Gerling, Kerstin & Schulte, Elisabeth & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2003. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: a survey," Working Paper Series 0256, European Central Bank.
  10. James Bullard & Christopher J. Waller, 2002. "Central bank design in general equilibrium," Working Papers 1998-002, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  11. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
  12. Rudi Dornbusch & Carlo Favero & Francesco Giavazzi, 1998. "Immediate challenges for the European Central Bank," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 15-64, 04.
  13. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  14. Ellen E. Meade & D. Nathan Sheets, 2002. "Regional influences on U.S. monetary policy: some implications for Europe," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20091, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  15. Dixit, Avinash, 2000. "A Repeated Game Model of Monetary Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 759-80, October.
  16. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  17. von Hagen, Jurgen & Suppel, Ralph, 1994. "Central bank constitutions for federal monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 774-782, April.
  18. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Bernd Hayo & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2011. "Behind closed doors: Revealing the ECB’s Decision Rule," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201135, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  2. Irena Radović, 2009. "Challenges for Monetary Policy in the Enlarged European Monetary Union," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 56(1), pages 95-110, March.
  3. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2007. "How committees reduce the volatility of policy rates," DULBEA Working Papers 07-11.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  4. Aleksander Berentsen & Carlo Strub, 2008. "Central Bank Design with Heterogeneous Agents," IEW - Working Papers 365, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  5. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2008. "How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates," Working Papers CEB 08-026.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  6. R. Emre Aytimur & Aristotelis Boukouras & Robert Schwager, 2012. "The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control," CESifo Working Paper Series 3900, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Carsten Hefeker, 2006. "The monetary policy consequences of enlargement," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(4), pages 29-34, December.
  8. Carsten Hefeker, 2011. "Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms in a Monetary Union," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(3), pages 274-285, 08.
  9. Zeno Rotondi & Giacomo Vaciago, 2007. "Lessons from the ECB experience: Frankfurt still matters!," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0070, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
  10. Carsten Hefeker, 2006. "EMU Enlargement, Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms," CESifo Working Paper Series 1767, CESifo Group Munich.

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