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How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates

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  • Farvaque, Etienne
  • Matsueda, Norimichi
  • Méon, Pierre-Guillaume

Abstract

This paper relates the volatility of interest rates to the collective nature of monetary policymaking in monetary unions. Several decision rules are modelled, including hegemonic and democratic procedures, and also committees headed by a chairman. A ranking of decision rules in terms of the volatility of policy rates is obtained, showing that the presence of a chairman has a cooling effect. However, members of a monetary union are better off under symmetric rules (voting, averaging, bargaining), unless they themselves chair the union. The results are robust to the inclusion of heterogeneities among members of the monetary union.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Macroeconomics.

Volume (Year): 31 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 534-546

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:31:y:2009:i:4:p:534-546

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622617

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Keywords: Monetary policy committees Decision procedures Interest-rate Monetary union;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Etienne Farvaque & Hakim Hammadou & Piotr Stanek, 2011. "Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(2), pages 223-238, 05.
  2. Roman Horváth & Kateřina Šmídková & Jan Zápal, 2012. "Central Banks' Voting Records and Future Policy," Working Papers 316, Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (Institute for East and South-East European Studies).
  3. Volker Hahn, 2012. "Designing Monetary Policy Committees," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-23, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  4. Dumiter Florin Cornel, 2012. "The Crucial Role Of Central Bank Transparency In Assessing The Monetary Policy Committee Mechanism," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(2), pages 557-563, December.
  5. Tim Aldridge & Amy Wood, 2014. "Monetary policy decision-making and accountability structures: some cross-country comparisons," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 77, pages 15-30, March.
  6. Maurin, Vincent & Vidal, Jean-Pierre, 2012. "Monetary policy deliberations: committee size and voting rules," Working Paper Series 1434, European Central Bank.

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