This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Central Bank Boards around the World: Why does Membership Size Differ?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Helge Berger ()
Volker Nitsch ()
Tonny Lybek ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board’s size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp1897.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1897.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1897

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

Related research
Keywords: committee council governance decision making monetary policy

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Tokhir Mirzoev, 2004. "Limited Commitment, Inaction and Optimal Monetary Policy," Macroeconomics 0409027, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Aleksander Berentsen & Gabriele Camera & Christopher Waller, . "Money, Credit and Banking," IEW - Working Papers iewwp219, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Andrew K. Rose, 2006. "Size Really Doesn't Matter: In Search of a National Scale Effect," NBER Working Papers 12191, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Helge Berger & Jakob Haan, 2002. "Are small countries too powerful within the ECB?," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(3), pages 263-282, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Piketty, Thomas, 1999. "The information-aggregation approach to political institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 791-800, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Alain Ize, 2006. "Spending Seigniorage: Do Central Banks Have a Governance Problem?," IMF Working Papers 06/58, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  8. Kerstin Gerling & Hans Peter Grüner & Alexandra Kiel & Elisabeth Schulte, 2003. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," Working Paper Series 256, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2008. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Working papers 08-195, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Anne Sibert, 2006. "Central Banking by Committee," International Finance, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(2), pages 145-168, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. D'Amato, Marcello & Martina, Riccardo, 2005. "Credibility and commitment of monetary policy in open economies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 872-902, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Clare Lombardelli & James Proudman & James Talbot, 2005. "Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-Making," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(1), May. [Downloadable!]
  13. Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2006. "Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members," Working Papers DULBEA 06-05.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. repec:rus:hseeco:181565 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco Ruge-Murcia, 2006. "The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee," 2006 Meeting Papers 206, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-77, August.
  17. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2004. "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(1), pages 1-48, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2001. "Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature," NBER Working Papers 8161, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Gerlach-Kristen, Petra, 2006. "Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 487-507, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Fujiki, Hiroshi, 2005. "The Monetary Policy Committee and the Incentive Problem: A Selective Survey," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 23(S1), pages 37-82, October. [Downloadable!]
  21. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2004. "The Effects of Learning in Interactive Monetary Policy Committees," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-029/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  22. Blinder, Alan S & Morgan, John, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better than One? Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 789-811, October.
  23. Romer, David, 1993. "Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(4), pages 869-903, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  24. Benigno, Pierpaolo, 2004. "Optimal monetary policy in a currency area," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 293-320, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  25. Lombardelli, Clare & Proudman, James & Talbot, James, 2005. "Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision Making," MPRA Paper 823, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  26. Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo & Sturzenegger, Federico, 2005. "Classifying exchange rate regimes: Deeds vs. words," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1603-1635, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  28. Rose, Andrew K., 2006. "Size really doesn't matter: In search of a national scale effect," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 482-507, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marc-André Gosselin, 2007. "Central Bank Performance under Inflation Targeting," Working Papers 07-18, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  2. Szilárd Erhart & Jose Luis Vasquez-Paz, 2008. "Determinants of the size of a monetary policy committee: Theory and cross country evidence," Working Papers 2008-001, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú. [Downloadable!]
  3. Szilárd Erhart & Jose Luis Vasquez-Paz, 2007. "Optimal Monetary Policy Committee Size: Theory and Cross Country Evidence," Kiel Advanced Studies Working Papers 439, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes books.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-26.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.