IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/cesptp/hal-00634791.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area

Author

Listed:
  • Agnès Bénassy-Quéré

    (CEPII - Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales - Centre d'analyse stratégique, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Edouard Turkisch

Abstract

We study the impact of rotating votes in the ECB Governing Council after EMU enlargement, based on national and euro-wide Taylor rules and on a convergence assumption. We find that the rotation system yields monetary policy decisions that are close both to full centralization and to a voting rule without rotations.

Suggested Citation

  • Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Edouard Turkisch, 2009. "The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00634791, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00634791
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.01832.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.
    2. Yunus Aksoy & Paul De Grauwe & Hans Dewachter, 2014. "Do Asymmetries Matter for European Monetary Policy?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Exchange Rates and Global Financial Policies, chapter 13, pages 321-353, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 207-235, September.
    4. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Styczynska, 2006. "The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(5), pages 865-897, December.
    5. Carsten Hefeker, 2003. "Federal Monetary Policy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 105(4), pages 643-659, December.
    6. Helge Berger & Jakob Haan, 2002. "Are small countries too powerful within the ECB?," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(3), pages 263-282, September.
    7. Anne Sibert, 2006. "Central Banking by Committee," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 145-168, August.
    8. Christian Fahrholz & Philipp Mohl, 2004. "EMU-enlargement and the Reshaping of Decision-making within the ECB Governing Council: A Voting-Power Analysis," Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone Working Papers wp23, Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, revised 01 Jun 2004.
    9. Lewis, John, 2009. "Hitting and hoping?: Meeting the exchange rate and inflation criteria during a period of nominal convergence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 508-524, December.
    10. Friedrich Heinemann & Felix P. Huefner, 2004. "Is The View From The Eurotower Purely European? – National Divergence And Ecb Interest Rate Policy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(4), pages 544-558, September.
    11. Helge Berger & Till Mueller, 2007. "How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 471-484, September.
    12. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John, 1995. "The Biases of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(2), pages 274-284, April.
    13. Dorothee Heisenberg, 2003. "Cutting the Bank Down to Size: Efficient and Legitimate Decision‐making in the European Central Bank After Enlargement," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 397-420, June.
    14. Clare Lombardelli & James Proudman & James Talbot, 2005. "Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-Making," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(1), May.
    15. Süppel, Ralph & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1994. "Central Bank Constitutions for Monetary Unions," CEPR Discussion Papers 919, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Ullrich, Katrin, 2006. "An impact of country-specific economic developments on ECB decisions," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-049, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    17. von Hagen, Jurgen & Suppel, Ralph, 1994. "Central bank constitutions for federal monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 774-782, April.
    18. Michael Frenkel & Ralf Fendel, 2003. "The new ECB voting system: Some room for improvement," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 38(6), pages 334-338, November.
    19. Daniel Gros, 2003. "An opportunity missed!," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 38(3), pages 124-129, May.
    20. Moutot, Philippe & Jung, Alexander & Mongelli, Francesco Paolo, 2008. "The working of the eurosystem: monetary policy preparations and decision-making - selected issues," Occasional Paper Series 79, European Central Bank.
    21. Ulrich Bindseil, 2001. "A Coalition-Form Analysis Of The “One Country - One Vote” Rule In The Governing Council Of The European Central Bank," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(1), pages 145-164.
    22. Philippe Moutot & Alexander Jung & Francesco Paolo Mongelli, 2008. "The working of the eurosystem - monetary policy preparations and decision-making – selected issues," Occasional Paper Series 79, European Central Bank.
    23. Mr. Helge Berger, 2002. "The ECB and Euro-Area Enlargement," IMF Working Papers 2002/175, International Monetary Fund.
    24. Lewis, John, 2009. "Hitting and hoping?: Meeting the exchange rate and inflation criteria during a period of nominal convergence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 508-524, December.
    25. Ullrich, Katrin, 2004. "Decision-Making of the ECB: Reform and Voting Power," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-70, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    26. Blinder, Alan S & Morgan, John, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better than One? Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 789-811, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:zbw:rwirep:0175 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Antoine Berthou & Lionel Fontagné, 2010. "Economic Divergence Within the Euro Area: Lessons for EMU Enlargement," Chapters, in: Ewald Nowotny & Peter Mooslechner & Doris Ritzberger-Grünwald (ed.), The Euro and Economic Stability, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Ansgar Belke & Barbara von Schnurbein, 2010. "European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model: Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 983, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Ansgar Belke & Jens Klose, 2017. "Equilibrium Real Interest Rates and Secular Stagnation: An Empirical Analysis for Euro Area Member Countries," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(6), pages 1221-1238, November.
    5. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Schnurbein, 2012. "European monetary policy and the ECB rotation model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 289-323, April.
    6. Ansgar Belke & Barbara von Schnurbein, 2010. "European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model – Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery," Ruhr Economic Papers 0175, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    7. Christian Aubin & Ibrahima Diouf & Dominique Pepin, 2010. "Inertie De La Politique Monétaire Dans La Zone Euro : Le Rôle De L'Hétérogénéité," Post-Print hal-00960030, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Edouard Turkisch, 2009. "The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro Area," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47, pages 25-53, January.
    2. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 207-235, September.
    3. Helge Berger & Till Mueller, 2007. "How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 471-484, September.
    4. Ansgar Belke & Barbara Schnurbein, 2012. "European monetary policy and the ECB rotation model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 289-323, April.
    5. Helge Berger, 2006. "Unfinished business? The ECB reform ahead of euro area enlargement," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(4), pages 35-41, December.
    6. Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 817-832, December.
    7. Robert-Paul Berben & Beata Bierut & Philipp Maier, 2012. "The role of regional information in the optimal composition of a committee," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 510-517.
    8. Belke, Ansgar & von Schnurbein, Barbara, 2010. "European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model – Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery," Ruhr Economic Papers 175, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    9. repec:zbw:rwirep:0175 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2008. "The Role of the Chairman in Setting Monetary Policy: Individualistic vs. Autocratically Collegial MPCs," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(3), pages 119-143, September.
    11. Ansgar Belke & Barbara von Schnurbein, 2010. "European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model – Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery," Ruhr Economic Papers 0175, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    12. Vollmer Uwe, 2004. "Wer entscheidet über Leitzinssatzänderungen?: Zur optimalen Verfassung des Zentralbankrats in einer Währungsunion," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 55(1), pages 287-312, January.
    13. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2011. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(2), pages 452-475, October.
    14. Hans Gersbach & Bernhard Pachl, 2009. "Flexible Majority Rules for Central Banks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2-3), pages 507-516, March.
    15. Bernd Hayo & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2013. "Behind closed doors: Revealing the ECB’s decision rule," Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 37, pages 135-160, October.
    16. Marcus Drometer & Thomas Siemsen & Sebastian Watzka, 2018. "The Monetary Policy of the ECB: Caring for the Weakest Links," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(4), pages 537-556, November.
    17. Ullrich, Katrin, 2004. "Decision-Making of the ECB: Reform and Voting Power," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-70, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    18. Berger, Helge & Hefeker, Carsten, 2005. "One Country, One Vote? Labor Market Structure and Voting Rights in the ECB," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 20, pages 672-687.
    19. Christian Fahrholz & Philipp Mohl, 2004. "EMU-enlargement and the Reshaping of Decision-making within the ECB Governing Council: A Voting-Power Analysis," Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone Working Papers wp23, Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, revised 01 Jun 2004.
    20. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Robert Inklaar & Jakob de Haan, 2003. "Restructuring the ECB," CESifo Working Paper Series 1084, CESifo.
    21. Gerlach-Kristen, Petra, 2006. "Monetary policy committees and interest rate setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 487-507, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00634791. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.