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The Monetary Policy Committee and the Incentive Problem: A Selective Survey

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Author Info
Fujiki, Hiroshi (Bank of Japan)

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Abstract

This paper strives to answer five questions. First, why do legislators choose to create an independent central bank? Second, why do legislators delegate the conduct of monetary policy to a committee, rather than to a central bank governor? Third, what kinds of factors are crucial in limiting the size of the committee? Fourth, should the committee disclose individual members' voting records in addition to their policy decisions? Fifth, to what extent do current committee members constrain the decisions of future committee members? A selective review of the relevant economic literature suggests the conclusion that there is reasonable consensus on the first and second questions. The remaining three questions are still unresolved.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan in its journal Monetary and Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 23 (2005)
Issue (Month): S1 (October)
Pages: 37-82
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Handle: RePEc:ime:imemes:v:23:y:2005:i:s1:p:37-82

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Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation

Cited by:
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  1. Janet L. Yellen, 2005. "Policymaking on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC): transparency and continuity," Speech, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue May 31. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2008. "Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 655-683, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch & Tonny Lybek, 2006. "Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?," IMF Working Papers 06/281, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal Central Bank Design: Benchmarks for the ECB," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  5. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch, 2008. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Working papers 08-195, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Janet L. Yellen, 2005. "Policymaking on the FOMC: transparency and continuity," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Sep 2. [Downloadable!]
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