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The Monetary Policy Committee and the Incentive Problem: A Selective Survey

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  • Fujiki, Hiroshi

    (Bank of Japan)

Abstract

This paper strives to answer five questions. First, why do legislators choose to create an independent central bank? Second, why do legislators delegate the conduct of monetary policy to a committee, rather than to a central bank governor? Third, what kinds of factors are crucial in limiting the size of the committee? Fourth, should the committee disclose individual members' voting records in addition to their policy decisions? Fifth, to what extent do current committee members constrain the decisions of future committee members? A selective review of the relevant economic literature suggests the conclusion that there is reasonable consensus on the first and second questions. The remaining three questions are still unresolved.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan in its journal Monetary and Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 23 (2005)
Issue (Month): S1 (October)
Pages: 37-82

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Handle: RePEc:ime:imemes:v:23:y:2005:i:s1:p:37-82

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Cited by:
  1. Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 817-832, December.
  2. Roman Horváth & Kateřina Šmídková & Jan Zápal, 2012. "Central Banks' Voting Records and Future Policy," Working Papers 316, Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung (Institute for East and South-East European Studies).
  3. Matthias Neuenkirch & Pierre Siklos, 2013. "How Monetary Policy is Made: Two Canadian Tales," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201341, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  4. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsc, 2011. "Too Many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 452-475, October.
  5. Berger, Helge, 2005. "Optimal central bank design: benchmarks for the ECB," Discussion Papers 2005/27, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  6. Jan Marc Berk & Beata Bierut, 2008. "Monetary Policy Committees: meetings and outcomes," DNB Working Papers 184, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  7. Janet L. Yellen, 2005. "Policymaking on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC): transparency and continuity," Speech 13, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  8. Helge Berger, 2006. "Unfinished business? The ECB reform ahead of euro area enlargement," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(4), pages 35-41, December.
  9. Esteban Colla De Robertis & Last: Colla De Robertis, 2010. "Monetary policy committees and the decision to publish voting records," Documentos de Investigación - Research Papers 1, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA.
  10. Helge Berger & Tonny Lybek & Volker Nitsch, 2006. "Central Bank Boards Around the World," IMF Working Papers 06/281, International Monetary Fund.

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