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Monetary policy committees and the decision to publish voting records

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  • Esteban Colla De Robertis
  • Last: Colla De Robertis

    (Universidad Panamericana, Escuela de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales)

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    File URL: http://www.cemla.org/PDF/investigacion/INV-2010-12-01.pdf
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    Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA in its series Documentos de Investigación - Research Papers with number 1.

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    Length: 35
    Date of creation: Dec 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:cml:docinv:1

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    1. Mike Felgenhauer & Hans Peter Grüner, 2008. "Committees and Special Interests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 219-243, 04.
    2. Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-77, August.
    4. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    5. Anne Sibert, 2009. "Is Transparency About Central Bank Plans Desirable?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 7(4), pages 831-857, 06.
    6. Besley, Timothy & Meads, Neil & Surico, Paolo, 2007. "Insiders versus Outsiders in Monetary Policy-Making," Discussion Papers, Monetary Policy Committee Unit, Bank of England 20, Monetary Policy Committee Unit, Bank of England.
    7. Olivier Blanchard & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Paolo Mauro, 2010. "Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 199-215, 09.
    8. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
    9. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2005. "Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5155, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 2008. "The FOMC versus the Staff: Where Can Monetary Policymakers Add Value?," NBER Working Papers 13751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
    12. Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, 2007. "Leadership in Groups: A Monetary Policy Experiment," NBER Working Papers 13391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Sibert, Anne, 1999. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2328, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, December.
    15. Vickers, John, 1986. "Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 443-55, November.
    16. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
    17. Beck, T.H.L. & Clarke, G. & Groff, A. & Keefer , P. & Walsh, P., 2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125517, Tilburg University.
    18. Anke Weber, 2010. "Monetary Policy Committees, Learning, and Communication," IMF Working Papers 10/85, International Monetary Fund.
    19. Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2008. "Purdah: on the rationale for central bank silence around policy meetings," Working Paper Series, European Central Bank 0868, European Central Bank.
    20. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
    21. Fujiki, Hiroshi, 2005. "The Monetary Policy Committee and the Incentive Problem: A Selective Survey," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 23(S1), pages 37-82, October.
    22. Otmar Issing, 1999. "The Eurosystem: Transparent andAccountable or 'Willem in Euroland'," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, 09.
    23. Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665.
    24. Mihov, Ilian & Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Credibility and Flexibility with Independent Monetary Policy Committees," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(1), pages 23-46, February.
    25. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    26. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2004. "Is the MPC's Voting Record Informative about Future UK Monetary Policy?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(2), pages 299-313, 06.
    27. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
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