This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Meade, Ellen E
Sheets, D Nathan

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper looks at the monetary policy decisions of the U.S. Federal Reserve and asks whether observed voting patterns have been driven entirely by national concerns, or whether regional factors have also played a role. We find that Fed policymakers take into account developments in regional unemployment when casting votes on monetary policy. These results are robust to different specifications of the voting equation. This research is relevant for the Fed, and it may also be relevant for Europe's fledgling central bank in Frankfurt in light of regional differences within the euro area.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 37 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 661-77
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:37:y:2005:i:4:p:661-77

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2008. "Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(1), pages 213-233, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," DNB Working Papers 170, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "On the Optimality of Decisions made by Hub-and-Spokes Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 027, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  4. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2008. "How monetary policy committees impact the volatility of policy rates," Working Papers CEB 08-026.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
  5. Jan-Egbert Sturm & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2008. "The Stress of Having a Single Monetary Policy in Europe," KOF Working papers 08-190, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2007. "How committees reduce the volatility of policy rates," Working Papers DULBEA 07-11.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
  7. Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch & Tonny Lybek, 2006. "Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?," IMF Working Papers 06/281, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "Communication in Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 059, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  9. Helge Berger, 2006. "Optimal Central Bank Design: Benchmarks for the ECB," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  10. Ellen Meade, 2006. "Dissent and Disagreement on the Fed's FOMC: Understanding Regional Affiliations and limits to Transparency," DNB Working Papers 094, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  11. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2008. "The Role of the Chairman in Setting Monetary Policy: Individualistic vs. Autocratically Collegial MPCs," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(3), pages 119-143, September. [Downloadable!]
  12. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2005. "Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 5155, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Helge Berger, 2006. "Unfinished business? The ECB reform ahead of euro area enlargement," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(4), pages 35-41, December. [Downloadable!]
  14. Harris, Mark & Spencer, Christopher, 2008. "Decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members," MPRA Paper 9100, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  15. Ellen E. Meade, 2005. "The FOMC: preferences, voting, and consensus," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 93-101. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc data is maintained by each archive holder on its own website. Nothing is held centrally.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.