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Committees and Special Interests

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  • MIKE FELGENHAUER
  • HANS PETER GRÜNER

Abstract

This paper studies the aggregation of decentralized information in committees under open and closed voting in the presence of external influence. We show that under one-sided influence decision quality may be nonmonotonic in the committee members' ability. Furthermore, restricting the information of interest groups may reduce the bias toward special interest politics. This result holds in a single and in a common agency setting, where opposing interest groups' activities do not cancel out in equilibrium. Moreover, there are cases where benefits from increasing the number of decision makers can only be reaped if the committee's sessions are not public. Copyright 2008 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 219-243

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:10:y:2008:i:2:p:219-243

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References

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  1. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1994. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1117, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Timothy J. Fedderson & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1195, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 827, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Bhattacharjee, A. & Holly, S., 2010. "Understanding Interactions in Social Networks and Committees," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 1003, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  2. Mike Felgenhauer, 2012. "Revealing information in electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 55-68, October.
  3. Bhattacharjee, Arnab & Holly, Sean, 2009. "Understanding Interactions in Social Networks and Committees," SIRE Discussion Papers, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) 2009-53, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  4. Esteban Colla De Robertis & Last: Colla De Robertis, 2010. "Monetary policy committees and the decision to publish voting records," Documentos de Investigación - Research Papers, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA 1, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA.
  5. Mike Felgenhauer, 2007. "Policy Bias Equivalence under Common Agency," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 295-312, April.
  6. Felgenhauer, Mike, 2010. "Transparency and special interests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 4-7, January.
  7. Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.
  8. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007. "Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 493, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  9. Felgenhauer, Mike & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2007. "Safety Nets Within Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6317, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2009. "Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(5), pages 831-853, 08.
  11. Winschel, Evguenia, 2012. "Coalition formation for unpopular reform in the presence of private reputation costs," Working Papers, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics 13-08, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.

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