1. Akerlof, George A & Yellen, Janet L, 1985. "Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 708-20, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, 2003. "Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 24-44, April.
3. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar, 2001. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 259-294, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 1998. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Wallis Working Papers WP14, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
   • John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 1999. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Working Papers 9904, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
5. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "Deliberation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 1359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
6. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1994. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," NBER Working Papers 4877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Gary S. Becker, 1984. "Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 35, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
   Other versions:
   • Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-24, June.
   Other versions:
   • Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "The Swing Voter's Curse," Discussion Papers 1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
10. Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-35, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
    Other versions:
    • Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1994. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Discussion Papers 1117, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
12. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Ichiro Obara, 2006. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001206, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ichiro Obara, 2007. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000137, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Ichiro Obara, . "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," UCLA Economics Online Papers 374, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Ichiro Obara, 2008. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1399-1399. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Sourav Bhattacharya, 2006. "Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections," Working Papers 325, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2007. [Downloadable!]
3. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2008. "On the Benefits of Costly Voting," Economics Working Papers 83, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
4. Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005. "Communicating with a Team of Experts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
5. Minoru Kitahara & Yohei Sekiguchi, 2006. "Aggregate Accuracy under Majority Rule with Heterogeneous Cost Functions," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(25), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
6. Oliveros, Santiago, 2007. "Endogenous information in committees and aggregation of information in large elections," MPRA Paper 7727, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
7. Dan Bernhardt & Stefan Krasa & Mattias Polborn, 2006. "Political Polarization and the Electoral Effects of Media Bias," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Bernhardt, Dan & Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias, 2008. "Political polarization and the electoral effects of media bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1092-1104, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Brian Logan & Daniel Sutter, 2004. "Newspaper quality, pulitzer prizes, and newspaper circulation," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 32(2), pages 100-112, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. ALDASHEV, Gani, 2006. "Political information acquisition for social exchange," CORE Discussion Papers 2006020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
10. Valentino Larcinese, 2005. "Electoral Competition and Redistribution with Rationally Informed Voters," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 4(1), pages 1366-1366. [Downloadable!] (restricted)