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Jury Size and the Free Rider Problem

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Author Info
Kaushik Mukhopadhaya
Abstract

In recent times, judges in the United States have said that 6-person juries are inferior to 12-person juries. But by what reasoning is a smaller jury inferior? One argument is the Condorcet jury theorem, which says that a larger jury will reach a more accurate decision. This, however, assumes that the information of each juror is independent of the size of the jury. I show that a juror's information does depend on the size of the jury. In a larger jury panel each juror has less incentive to pay attention in the court, even though they are all pledged to hear and deliver a verdict on a trial. Because of the free-rider problem, a larger jury may actually make poorer decisions. The results apply to many environments in which decisions are made by committees and work teams. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.

Volume (Year): 19 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 24-44
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:1:p:24-44

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  1. Parimal Bag & Paul Levine & Christopher Spencer, 2006. "A note on: jury size and the free rider problem," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(3), pages 1-12. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Amihai Glazer, 2006. "Predicting Committee Action," Working Papers 050621, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Martina Behm & Hans Grüner, 2009. "Reliability of Information Aggregation with Regional Biases: A Note," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 66(4), pages 355-371, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sayantan Ghosal & Ben Lockwood, 2009. "Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: is turnout too high or too low?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 25-50, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Eric Helland & Yaron Raviv, 2008. "The optimal jury size when jury deliberation follows a random walk," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 255-262, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005. "Communicating with a Team of Experts," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
  7. Minoru Kitahara & Yohei Sekiguchi, 2006. "Aggregate Accuracy under Majority Rule with Heterogeneous Cost Functions," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(25), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "On the Optimality of Decisions made by Hub-and-Spokes Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 027, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  9. Jan Marc Berk & Beata Bierut, 2004. "On the Optimality of Decisions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-120/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  10. César Martinelli, 2004. "Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000593, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2008. "Information Acquisition and Transparency in Committees," CEPR Discussion Papers 6677, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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